


Peddling Power Part 2

Flight AA11



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Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, any Web addresses or links contained in this work may have changed since writing the material and may no longer be valid. Should this circumstance arise, please see footnote. ²

¹ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

² Dead links, as they are termed, may be unearthed at [www.archive.org] and/or [<http://wayback.archive.org/web/>]

Official Lists & Reports

“This is something we had never seen before. This is like what you would only see in the movies. And they [aircraft blips] were descending right at the end at 10,000 feet per minute. That is absolutely unheard of for a commercial jet. They’re actually nosing the airplane down doing what I would call a power dive. I think there are some unanswered questions and I’m on the record on that point.”

—Dave Bottiglia ³
Air Traffic Controller on 9/11

The following documents presented pertain to the people on board Flight AA11: Flight manifest, ⁴ passenger list, boarding list, and non-show list. These documents are all that is needed to identify who was and who was not on board this aircraft. Before continuing, three points need to be given.

Point One.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on March 7, 2006, released a docket (given below) pertaining to the “accident” of Flight AA11 and its “probable cause;” due to the September 11, 2001, attacks being under the jurisdiction of the FBI, the NTSB generated all its reports “under the control of the FBI.” This would mean that any lists and/or reports and timelines coming from the NTSB would coincide exactly with the FBI’s material.

³ Dave Bottiglia is not referred to as an Air Traffic Controller for Flight AA11 on 9/11 in the FAA’s Accident Report released on November 13, 2001; he does however refer in this quotation to the radar screen blips he was witnessing on the morning of 9/11. We do not know if the blips he was noticing were the same “injects” that had been inserted into the War-game Global Guardian on that morning which will be analysed and researched in *Peddling Power* 3.

⁴ A flight manifest is a list of passengers (or in the case of a cargo flight, parcels) and crew of an aircraft compiled before departure based on flight check-in information. It is securely guarded to protect passengers’ privacy [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_manifest]

NTSB Identification: **DCA01MA060.**

The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact [Records Management Division](#).
Scheduled 14 CFR operation of American Airlines
Accident occurred Tuesday, September 11, 2001 in New York City, NY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 3/7/2006
Aircraft: Boeing 767-200ER, registration: N334AA
Injuries: 92 Fatal.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Safety Board provided requested technical assistance to the FBI, and this material generated by the NTSB is under the control of the FBI. The Safety Board does not plan to issue a report or open a public docket.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The Safety Board did not determine the probable cause and does not plan to issue a report or open a public docket. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Safety Board provided requested technical assistance to the FBI, and any material generated by the NTSB is under the control of the FBI.

[Full narrative available](#)

[Index for Sep2001](#) | [Index of months](#)

Point Two.

The official Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) released their data of Flight AA11, which depicts the aircraft was a cancelled flight for September 11, 2001.

Sheet 1.

Detailed Statistics Departures						
Airport: Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH - Logan International (BOS)						
Airline: American Airlines (AA)						
Month(s): September						
Day(s): 11						
Year(s): 2001						
NOTE: A complete listing of airline and airport abbreviations is available. Times are reported in local time using a 24 hour clock.						
Carrier Code	Date (MM/DD/YYYY)	Flight Number	Tail Number	Destination Airport	Scheduled Departure Time	Actual Departure Time
AA	09/11/2001	11	UNKNOWN	LAX	07:45	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	145	UNKNOWN	SJC	11:00	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	153	N232AA	ORD	08:30	08:29
AA	09/11/2001	163	UNKNOWN	LAX	15:30	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	181	UNKNOWN	LAX	11:00	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	189	N3BMAA	SEA	08:45	08:43
AA	09/11/2001	193	UNKNOWN	SFO	15:25	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	195	UNKNOWN	SFO	09:00	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	197	UNKNOWN	SFO	17:10	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	223	UNKNOWN	LAX	17:30	00:00
AA	09/11/2001	225	UNKNOWN	SAN	18:10	00:00

Analysis: Departure is given from Boston Logan International Airport. The carrier code is AA (American Airlines) with date for September 11, 2001. The flight number is 11; however the tail number is recorded as: UNKNOWN. Data obtained from American Airlines confirms the tail number of this flight to be N334AA via the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). From the statistic chart above (Sheet 1.) the flight is chartered with a destination for Los Angeles airport and is scheduled to depart at 07:45 a.m.; the actual departure time is 00:00, with schedule elapse time in 374 minutes. Actual elapse time in minutes being 0.

Sheet 2.

Scheduled Elapsed Time (Minutes)	Actual Elapsed Time (Minutes)	Departure Delay (Minutes)	Wheels-off Time	Taxi-out Time (Minutes)	Delay Carrier (Minutes)	Delay Weather (Minutes)
374	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	
380	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	
165	0	-1 08:41		12 N/A	N/A	
377	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	
380	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	
373	0	-2 08:56		13 N/A	N/A	
385	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	
397	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	
395	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	
381	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	
375	0	0 00:00		0 N/A	N/A	

Analysis: Here the chart shows a departure delay in minutes of 0 and wheels-off time 00:00. The taxi-out time in minutes is also 0 with delay time in minutes being N/A (unavailable). Delay due to weather is N/A (unavailable) whereas delay by the National Aviation System (NAS) in minutes also depicts N/A (unavailable). Finally, departure delay in minutes show 1 and wheels-off time due to all the aforesaid is 00:01.

A phone call to the Bureau of Transportation and Department of Transportation cleared up some anomalies seen in the above displays. ⁵ Apparently, when the charts depict tail number as UNKNOWN and actual departure time 00:00, it means that the particular flight, in this case AA11, is a cancelled flight.

Point Three.

Two lists regarding Flight AA11 were never released to the public domain; these were the flight manifest and the boarding list. The flight manifest would verify who checked in with luggage at the ticket desk, received a boarding pass, and consequently be assigned a seat location. The boarding list would assist in an investigation and also contribute information to the crew since it shows who checked in with luggage at the ticket desk and who received a boarding pass; it also shows seat arrangement.

⁵ [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y1L6okxBOBQ&feature=player_embedded]

The Passenger List of Flight AA11

A partial passenger list was released by the FBI in the early stages of an investigation. In addition, American Airlines, on September 12, 2001, under the instructions (control) of the FBI, released to the mainstream media their partial passenger list: Passengers (64), flight attendants (9), Captain (1), and, First Officer (1): Total 75 souls.

At a later date, the airline company publishes a full passenger list that now shows 81 passengers which also include the alleged hijackers' names. (List below) It is unknown if the FBI requested the airline to do this; however, since the full passenger list now contained the five alleged hijacker names, and one additional name, it is logical to assume these names came from the FBI and were forwarded to the airline company to include into their final list.

<p>G#1180S AA 11 11SEP BOS B32 745A 767 9/30/119 PDC</p> <p> AUTH 9 30 117 BOOKED 6 18 52 AVAIL 1 12 65</p> <p> THRU RV 0 0 0 NR 0 0 0 ASSIGN F C Y LCL RV 8 18 52 NR 1 1 1 RESTRICT A6P A6P D2T</p> <p> LCL ON* 9 19 53 TK 3 0 2 MEALS 9# 0 24# 1 59# 1 TTL ON* 9 19 53 ET 6 11 51 SETUPS 9 25 60 TLOB 9 19 53 PLAN 9 19 53</p> <p> BOS 80N 0736 LCL CLOSER F9C19Y53/SECOK- 1 H0Q.H0Q71AD 0800 11-SEP-2001 782693</p>																			
<p>G#1180S/ON</p> <p> AA 11 11SEP BOS B32 745A 767 ON LIST F9C19Y53</p> <p> 1 ALSHERRY WAIL P LAX 2A-F 1 SC LF CLUB ET 2 ALSHERRY WALEE P LAX 2B-F NB SC LF CLUB ET 3 MORABITO LAURA P LAX 2D-P 0 SC LF TKT AS 4 RETTA DAVID X LAX 2H-F NB SC LF CLUB AG 5 ROSS RICHARD P LAX 2J-F NB SC LF CLUB ET 6 NEWELL RENECE P LAX 3A-P NB 0B SC LF ET 7 BOUGHARD CAROL P LAX 3B-E NB 0B SC LF 8 FLYZIK CAROL X LAX 3H-F NB SC LF CLUB AG 9 PUOPOLO SONIA P LAX 3J-F 1 SC LF CLUB PL 10 HACKETT FAR PAGE U LAX 7A-F 2 SC LF ET 11 ANSELL DAVID AG2 U LAX 8A-F 1 SC LF ADM CLUB 12 ANSELL LYNN AG2 U LAX 8B-F NB SC LF ET 13 ATTA MOHAM AG2 J LAX 8D-F 2 1B EIB SC LF 14 ALQAMARI ABDUL AG2 J LAX 8G-F 0 1B EIB SC LF 15 GLAZER EDMUN R LAX 9A-F 0 SC LF PL TKT 16 LEVIN DANIE R LAX 9B-F 0 SC LF ADM CLUB 17 GAY PETER R LAX 9H-F NB SC LF EP TKT 18 HAYES ROBER H LAX 9J-F NB SC LF AG ET 19 HENNESSY EDUAR R LAX 10A-F NB SC LF AG ET 20 AL SUARIL SATAM J LAX 10B-F 1 SC LF ET 21 WAHLSTROM HARRY AG2 C LAX 10H-F 0 SC LF TKT 22 CURRIVAN PATRI J LAX 10J-F NB SC LF ADM TKT 23 CURRYGREEN ANDRE R LAX 11A-F NB SC LF ADM CLUB 24 MELLO CHRIS R LAX 11B-F 0 SC LF ADM ET 25 BEUG CAROL AG2 C LAX 11D-F 0 SC LF AG TKT 26 ROSENZWEIG PHILI R LAX 11G-F 0 SC LF ADM CLUB </p>																			
<p> 27 MLADENIK JEFF R LAX 11H-F 0 SC LF ADM CLUB 28 DOMINGUEZ ALBER J LAX 11J-E 2 SC LF 29 PERKINS BERTIN T LAX 19A-F 1 SC LF ET 30 KEATING BARBA V LAX 19B-F 2 0B SC LF AD 31 HASHEM PETER V LAX 20A-F 0 SC LF PL ET 32 KOVALCIN DAVID Y LAX 20B-F 0 0B SC LF AD 33 COOMBS JEFFE B LAX 20H-F NB SC LF AD ET 34 FYFE KARLE B LAX 20J-F NB SC LF AD ET 35 HUNTER NICHOL M LAX 22A-F 0 0B SC LF ADM 36 SACHS JESSI Y LAX 22B-F 2 SC LF ET 37 KAPLAN ROBIN L LAX 22H-F 1 SC LF AD ET 38 FILIPOV AL MR Y LAX 22J-F NB SC LF ADM CLUB 39 LASDEN N JAN AG2 L LAX 23A-F 1 0B SC LF ET 40 DITULLIO DONAL AG2 L LAX 23B-F 1 0B SC LF ET 41 MONTOYA ANTON N LAX 23J-F NB 60 LF TKT 42 WILLIAMS CANADA T LAX 24A-F 1 SC LF ET 43 KADIRAN MILDRED V LAX 24H-F 2 0B SC LF ET 44 WENCKE JOHN L LAX 24J-F 2 SC LF ET 45 HOFER DOUGL L LAX 25B-F NB SC LF AG ET 46 STONE DOUGL L LAX 25C-F 1 SC LF AD ET 47 BAKUTAN CHARIS L LAX 25H-F NB SC LF PL ET 48 FRIEDMAN PAUL Y LAX 25J-F NB SC LF ET 49 DALE BRIAN Y LAX 26B-F 0 SC LF ET 50 SMITH HEATH B LAX 26C-F 1 SC LF AD ET 51 BURNS KELLY Y LAX 26H-F 0 SC LF AD ET 52 MONTOYA CARLO L LAX 26J-F 1 SC LF AG ET 53 LAROCQUE JUDY T LAX 26J-F 0 SC LF AD ET 54 DIMEGLIO DAVID M LAX 27A-F 0 0B SC LF ET 55 NORTON JACQU AF2 N LAX 27B-F 1 1B 0B SC LF 56 NORTON ROBER AF2 N LAX 27C-F NB 1B 0B SC LF 57 HOLLAND CORA L LAX 27H-F 1 SC LF AD ET 58 CUCCINELLO THELM V LAX 27J-F 2 0B SC LF ET 59 NEIRA LAURI Y LAX 28B-E 1 SC LF EP EMPL 60 ARKSON MYRA B LAX 28C-F 1 SC LF AD ET 61 GEORGE LINDA M LAX 28J-F NB SC LF AD ET 62 ZARBA CHRIS V LAX 29A-F 0 SC LF ET 63 AYOYAMA SEIMA V LAX 29C-F NB SC LF AG ET 64 PEDORELLI THOMA T LAX 29J-F 0 SC LF ET 65 TRENTINI JAMES V LAX 30A-F 2 SC LF AD ET 66 TRENTINI MARY T LAX 30B-F NB SC LF AD ET 67 JENKINS JOHNC L LAX 30J-F 1 SC LF AD ET 68 ISKANDAR WALID T LAX 31A-F 1 SC LF ET 69 ORTH JANE L LAX 31B-F 2 0B EOB SC LF 70 JONES CHARL Y LAX 31G-F NB SC LF AG ET 71 LEE DANNY L LAX 31J-F 2 SC LF AG ET 72 FENN LISA M LAX 32H-F 1 SC LF ET 73 HACKRAY SUSAN M LAX 32J-F 1 SC LF ET 74 CAREY NELLI M LAX 33H-F NB SC LF AD ET 75 CREAMER TARA M LAX 33J-F NB SC LF ET 76 ALLISON ANNA B LAX 34C-F 1 SC LF ADM CLUB 77 SUAREZ XAVIE O LAX 34J-F 1 SC LF ET 78 SALIS RAMBA L LAX 35C-F 1 SC LF AD ET 79 VANDIKRISH PENDY M LAX 35J-F NB 0B SC LF AG 80 WADIE KANNE Y LAX 37G-F 1 SC LF PL ET </p>																			

#78 cannot be seen

Full Passenger List: 76 passengers + 5 alleged hijackers + 11 crew = Total 92
(Released by American Airlines via the FBI)⁶

⁶ #78 is Theodoridis Michael.

We do not know who or how many people from the full passenger list below (from *CNN* contributed by the *Associated Press*) actually checked in to receive their ticket, boarding pass, and be assigned a seat location due to the non-release of the flight manifest and the actual boarding list.

CNN Passenger List
Contributed by the *Associated Press*

No.	Seat	Name	AA List	FBI List	Occupation
1	34C	Allison Anna Williams	YES	YES	Founder of A2 Software Solutions
2	8A	Angell David	YES	YES	NBC Executive producer Served at the Pentagon
3	8B	Angell Lynn	YES	YES	
4	29C	Aoyama Seima	YES	YES	
5	28C	Aronson Myra	YES	YES	Analyst Compuware Corporation
6	25C	Barbutto Christine	YES	YES	TJX Cos.
7	11D	Beug Carolyn	YES	YES	
8	26G	Booms Kelly	YES	YES	
9	3B	Bouchard Carol	YES	YES	
10	33H	Casey Neilie	YES	YES	TJX Cos.
11	20H	Coombs Jeffrey	YES	YES	Security analyst Compaq Computer
12	33J	Creamer Tara	YES	YES	TJX Cos.
13	27J	Cuccinello Thelma	YES	YES	
14	10J	Currvan Patrick	YES	YES	
15	11A	Curry Green Andrew	YES	YES	
16	25J	Dale Brian	YES	YES	Accountant/Attorney Blue Capital Management
17	27A	DiMeglio David	YES	YES	
18	23B	Ditullio Donald	YES	YES	
19	11J	Dominguez Albert	YES	YES	Baggage handler Qantas Airways
20	22J	Filipov Alex	YES	YES	Concord Electrical Engineer
21	3H	Flyzik Carol	YES	YES	
22	25H	Friedman Paul	YES	YES	Consultant at Emergence Consulting
23	20J	Fyfe D.B. Karleton	YES	YES	Senior investment analyst
24	9H	Gay Peter	YES	YES	Vice President of operations for electronic systems at Raytheon Co.
25	28J	George Linda	YES	YES	TJX Cos.
26	9A	Glazer Edmund	YES	YES	Chief financial officer & Vice President at MRV Communications
27	32H	Gordenstein Lisa Fenn	YES	YES	TJX Cos.
28	7A	Hackel Farley Paige	YES	YES	
29	20A	Hashem Peter	YES	YES	Engineer
30	9J	Hayes Robert	YES	YES	Sales Engineer
31	10A	Hennessy Ted	YES	YES	Emergence Consulting
32	24J	Hofer John	YES	YES	
33	27H	Holland Cora	YES	YES	
34	22A	Humber Nicholas	YES	YES	Owner Brae Burn Management
35	31A	Iskandar Walid	YES	YES	(Not on CNN list)
36	30J	Jenkins John	YES	YES	
37	31G	Jones Charles	YES	YES	
38	22H	Kaplan Robin (CNN lists another person as: Caplan Robin)	YES	YES	TJX Cos.
39	19B	Keating Barbara	YES	YES	
40	20B	Kovalcin David	YES	YES	Senior mechanical engineer at Raytheon Co.
41	26J	Larocque Judy	YES	YES	Founder of Marketing Prospectives
42	23A	Lasden N. Janis	YES	YES	General Electric employee

43	31J	Lee Daniel John	YES	YES	
44	9B	Lewin Daniel C.	YES	YES	Co-founder Akamai Technologies Inc. Ex-Israeli Commando
45	32J	MacKay Susan	YES	YES	TJX Cos.
46	11B	Mello Chris	YES	YES	Alta Communications Financial analyst
47	11H	Mladenik Jeff	YES	YES	President of E-Logic
48	23H	Montoya Carlos	YES	YES	Spouse interviewed by FBI *
49	2D	Morabito Laura Lee	YES	YES	
50	24B	Naiman Mildred	YES	YES	
51	28B	Neira Laurie	YES	YES	
52	3A	Newell Renee	YES	YES	
53	27B	Norton Jacqueline	YES	YES	
54	27C	Norton Robert	YES	YES	
55	31B	Orth Jane	YES	YES	Lucent Technology
56	29J	Pecorelli Thomas	YES	YES	Fox Sports Cameraman
57	19A	Perkins Berin	YES	YES	
58	3J	Puopolo Morales Sonia	YES	YES	
59	2H	Retik David	YES	YES	
60	11G	Rosenzweig Philip	YES	YES	Executive Sun Microsystems
61	2J	Ross Richard	YES	YES	
62	22B	Sachs Jessica	YES	YES	Pricewaterhouse Accountant
63	35G	Salie Rahma	YES	YES	
64	26B	Smith Heather	YES	YES	Beacon Capital Partners
65	25B	Stone Douglas	YES	YES	
66	34J	Suarez Xavier	YES	YES	
67	35C	Theodoridis Michael	YES	YES	Consultant
68	30A	Trentini James	YES	YES	Assistant Principal at Everett
69	30B	Trentini Mary	YES	YES	Secretary at Everett
70	23J	Valdes Antonio Montoyia	YES	YES	
71	36J	Vamsikrish Pendy	YES	YES	
72	10H	Wahlstrom Mary	YES	YES	
73	37G	Waldie Kenneth	YES	YES	Senior quality engineer for electronic systems at Raytheon Co.
74	24H	Wenckus John	YES	YES	Tax consultant
75	24A	Williams Candace	YES	YES	
76	29A	Zarba Christopher	YES	YES	Software Engineer (Concord)

The following four individuals were announced to have been on Flight AA11 by CNN's passenger list; however, they were not found on the AA or the FBI passenger list. ⁷

No.	Seat	Name	AA List	FBI List	Occupation
1	?	Berenson Berry	NO	NO	Actor & photographer (<i>Only on CNN list</i>)
2	?	Caplin Robin	NO	NO	(<i>CNN lists another person as: Kaplan Robin</i>)
3	?	Larson Jude	NO	NO	(<i>Only on CNN list</i>)
4	?	Larson Natalie	NO	NO	(<i>Only on CNN list</i>)

* The spouse of passenger Carlos Montoya was interviewed by the FBI on September 12, 2001, at 11:00 a.m. The reason for this interview was that his name was also found on the passenger list for Flight UA175 that was involved in the WTC2 attack. Following is the FBI's redacted interview.

⁷ [<http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/victims/AA11.victims.html>]

9/11 First Responder/Family Privacy

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/21/2001

STACEY MONTOYA, Date of Birth (DOB) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview. Also present was Massachusetts State Trooper RICHARD MAHONEY. MONTOYA provided the following information:

MONTOYA advised that her husband, CARLOS MONTOYA was a passenger on UNITED AIRLINES Flight 175. MONTOYA stated that CARLOS was traveling from Boston to Los Angeles on business, with his final destination being Mexico City, Mexico. MONTOYA thought that this business trip was planned approximately two weeks prior to his actual departure. MONTOYA added that CARLOS is employed as a Relationship Manager with THOMPSON FINANCIAL, Boston, MA.

MONTOYA advised that CARLOS took a taxi to the LOGAN AIRPORT, leaving their residence at approximately 6:15 a.m. MONTOYA thought that her husband would have probably arrived at the airport at 6:45 a.m. on September 11, 2001. MONTOYA stated that CARLOS was carrying a folded garment bag which had a gold lock on the outside. MONTOYA added that CARLOS also had his leather bound computer case.

MONTOYA described her husband CARLOS as a dark skinned male, approximately 5'9", 180 to 185 lbs. He had dark hair, which he wore short, and was balding in the front. MONTOYA advised that CARLOS had some pockmarks on his face and almond shaped green colored eyes. MONTOYA stated that CARLOS was born in Columbia and his dentist was located in Columbia.

MONTOYA stated that CARLOS was wearing a platinum wedding ring with a gold edge on either side of the actual wedding ring. The ring was inscribed with the date June 9, 2001. MONTOYA added that her husband would have been wearing his silver Rolex watch, which was inscribed with the words "Contodomiamor." MONTOYA added that this phrase means "with all my love" in Spanish. MONTOYA stated that her husband could have wearing his silver SKAGEN watch instead of the Rolex. MONTOYA added that her husband was also wearing a gold chain with a cross on it and would have had his

Investigation on 9/12/01 at Logan Airport, Boston, MA

File # 265D-NY-280350

Date dictated 9/16/01

by 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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000000105

9/11 Commission Files

Montoya interview (FBI) September 12, 2001. 11:00 a.m.



American Airlines Flight #11

SEAT

PASSENGER

BOEING 767



Diagram illustrating the seating layout of the Boeing 767-223ER aircraft, showing the distribution of seats across three zones:

- ZONE A - FIRST 8 SEATS**
- ZONE B - BUSINESS 30 SEATS**
- ZONE C - ECONOMY 119 SEATS**

SEAT	PASSENGER	SEAT	PASSENGER	SEAT	PASSENGER	SEAT	PASSENGER	SEAT	PASSENGER
10B	Al Suqami, Satam	27J	Cucinello, Thelma	10A	Hennessy, Jr., Edward	11B	Mello, Christopher	11G	Rosenzweig, Philip
34C	Allison, Anna	10J	Curran, Patrick	24J	Hofer, John	11H	Mladenik, Jeffrey	2J	Ross, Richard
8G	Alomari, Abdul	25J	Dale, Brian	27H	Holland, Cora	23H	Montoya, Carlos	22B	Sachs, Jessica
2A	Alshehri, Wail	27A	DiMeglio, David	22A	Humber, Jr., John N.	2D	Morabito, Laura	35G	Salle, Rahma
2B	Alshehri, Waleed	23B	DiTullio, Donald	31A	Iskandar, Waleed	24B	Naiman, Mildred	26B	Smith, Heather
8A	Angell, David	11J	Dominguez, Alberto	30J	Jenkins, John	28B	Neira, Laurie	26B	Snyder, Dianne
8B	Angell, Lynn Edwards	7A	Farley-Hackel, Paige	31G	Jones, Charles	3A	Newell, Renee	25B	Stone, Douglas
29C	Aoyama, Seima	22J	Filipov, Alexander	22H	Kaplan, Robin	3A	Nicosia, Kathleen	34J	Suarez, Xavier
	Arestegui, Barbara	3H	Flyzik, Carol	19B	Keating, Barbara	27B	Norton, Jacqueline		Sweeney, Madeline
28C	Aronson, Myra	29H	Friedman, Paul	20B	Kovalcin, David	27C	Norton, Robert	35C	Theodoridis, Michael
8D	Atta, Mohamed	20J	Fyle, Karleton	26J	Larocque, Judith C.		Ogonowski, John	30A	Trentini, James
25C	Barbuto, Christine	9H	Gay, Peter	23A	Laxden, Natalie Janis		Ong, Betty	30B	Trentini, Mary-Barbara
11D	Beug, Carolyn	26J	George, Linda	31J	Lee, Daniel	31B	Orth, Jane	23J	Vakles, Antonio-Montoya
26G	Booms, Kelly	9A	Glazer, Edmund	9B	Levin, Daniel	28J	Pecorelli, Thomas	36J	Vamsikrishna, Pencydala
3B	Bouchard, Carol	32H	Gordenstein, Lisa	Low, Sara		19A	Perkins, Berintha	10H	Wahlstrom, Mary
33H	Casey, Nellie	11A	Green, Andrew	32J	MacKay, Susan	3J	Puopolo, Sonia	37G	Waldie, Kenneth
	Collman, Jeffrey	20A	Hashem, Peter		Martin, Karen	2H	Retik, David	24H	Wendkus, John
20H	Coombs, Jeffrey	9J	Hayes, Robert		McGuinness, Jr., Thomas		Rogier, Jean	24A	Williams, Candace
33J	Cremer, Tara							29A	Zarba, Jr., Christopher
		11 Crew		76 Passenger		5 Hijacker			





American Airlines
Flight 11

American Airlines
Flight 77

United Airlines
Flight 93

United Airlines
Flight 175





FBI list of passengers 76 + 5 alleged hijackers + 11 crew = Total 92

The NTSB's docket (given earlier) states "92 fatal," which would be 81 passengers and 11 crew members. The air disaster database also record 92 fatalities.⁸

Accident Database: Accident Synopsis 09112001



AirDisaster.Com Accident Database

» AirDisaster.Com » Accident Database » Accident Synopsis » 09112001


Date of Accident:	11 September 2001	?
Airline:	American Airlines	?
Aircraft:	Boeing 767-223ER	?
Location:	Manhattan, New York, USA	?
Registration:	N334AA	?
Previous Registrations:	---	?
Flight Number:	11	?
Fatalities:	92-92	?
MSN:	22332	?
Line Number:	169	?
Engine Manufacturer:	General Electric	?
Engine Model:	CF6-80A2	?
Year of Delivery:	1987	?
Accident Description:	At 8:45am local time, American Airlines Flight 11, flying from Boston, Massachusetts to Los Angeles, California, impacted the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City after being hijacked by terrorists. The north tower of the World Trade Center was severely damaged, and collapsed approximately an hour later. Nearly 3,000 people on the ground, including occupants of both World Trade Center towers, firefighters, and police officers were killed.	

Related Links/Information: [Photos](#) - AirDisaster.Com Photo Database
[Special Report: September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks](#) - AirDisaster.Com
 Boeing 767 N334AA. Photo Copyright: Alexander Jonsson

Related Links/Information: [Photos](#) - AirDisaster.Com Photo Database
[Special Report: September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks](#) - AirDisaster.Com
 Boeing 767 N334AA. Photo Copyright: Alexander Jonsson

⁸ [http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=09112001®=N334AA&airline=American+Airlines]


The NTSB Factual Report coincides with the FBI's number of persons on board.

 National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION		NTSB ID: DCA01MA060			
		Occurrence Date: 09/11/2001			
		Occurrence Type: Accident			
Weather Information					
WOF ID	Observation Time	Time Zone	WOF Elevation Ft. MSL	WOF Distance From Accident Site NM	Direction From Accident Site Deg. Mag.
Sky/Lowest Cloud Condition:				Ft. AGL	Condition of Light:
Lowest Ceiling:			Ft. AGL	Visibility: SM	Altimeter: "Hg
Temperature: °C	Dew Point: °C	Wind Direction:		Density Altitude: Ft.	
Wind Speed:	Gusts:	Weather Conditions at Accident Site:			
Visibility (RVR): Ft.	Visibility (RVV) SM	Intensity of Precipitation:			
Restrictions to Visibility:					
Type of Precipitation:					
Accident Information					
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed		Aircraft Fire:		Aircraft Explosion	
Classification:					
- Injury Summary Matrix	Fatal	Serious	Minor	None	TOTAL
First Pilot	1				1
Second Pilot	1				1
Student Pilot					
Flight Instructor					
Check Pilot					
Flight Engineer					
Cabin Attendants	9				9
Other Crew					
Passengers	81				81
- TOTAL ABOARD -	92				92
Other Ground					
- GRAND TOTAL -	92				92

The FAA Accident Report (below), released on November 13, 2001, contradicts the FBI's passenger number, the American Airline passenger number, the NTSB docket and Factual Report passenger number, and also the air disaster database passenger number by stating, "number aboard aircraft 81," and then "number fatalities 81."

Sheet 1.

ZBW-ARTCC-148
AAL11

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT				REPORT DATE November 13, 2001		REPORT NO ZBW-ARTCC-148				
NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY Boston (ZBW) ARTCC										
1. AIRCRAFT TYPE AND IDENTIFICATION: Boeing 767-200, (B762), AAL11		2. DATE/TIME OF ACCIDENT (GMT) September 11, 2001, 1246 UTC		3. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT New York, New York						
4. NATURE OF ACCIDENT: Impact With World Trade Center North Tower				5. TYPE OF FLIGHT Air Carrier, Domestic Flight, IFR Flight Plan						
6. FLIGHT CREW	NAME	POSITION	ADDRESS (CITY AND STATE)	UNIN- JURED	IN- JURED	FATAL- ITY				
	John Ogonowski	Pilot	Dracut, Massachusetts			X				
	Thomas McGuinness	First Officer	Portsmouth, New Hampshire			X				
	Barbara Arestegui	Flight Attendant	Marston Mills, Massachusetts			X				
	Jeffery Collman	Flight Attendant	Novato, California			X				
	Sara Low	Flight Attendant	Batesville, Arkansas			X				
	Karen Martin	Flight Attendant	Danvers, Massachusetts			X				
7. PASSENGER DATA: (If available, list names, addresses, extent of injuries, and other information on continuation sheet.)			NUMBER ABOARD AIRCRAFT	81	NUMBER UNIN- JURED	0	NUMBER INJURED	0	NUMBER FATAL- ITIES	81
8. AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: Destroyed			9. PROPERTY DAMAGE: World Trade Center North Tower Destroyed							
10. OPERATING STATUS OF NAVIGATIONAL AIDS/LIGHTS/COMMUNICATIONS: Normal										
11. WEATHER DATA	CONDITIONS IN ACCIDENT AREA AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: METAR La Guardia, Flushing, New York, 0851 EDT, wind three two zero degrees at nine knots, visibility one zero statute miles, few clouds at twenty five thousand, temperature two zero degrees celsius, dew point one four degrees celsius, altimeter three zero one three; remarks - automated station with weather discriminator, sea level pressure two zero one, temperature positive, temperature twenty point zero degrees celsius, dewpoint positive, dewpoint thirteen point nine degrees celsius.									
	REPORT JUST PRIOR TO ACCIDENT: METAR La Guardia, Flushing, New York, 0751 EDT, wind three two zero degrees at nine knots, visibility one zero statute miles, few clouds at twenty five thousand, temperature one nine degrees celsius, dew point one four degrees celsius, altimeter three zero one one; remarks - automated station with weather discriminator, sea level pressure one nine six, twenty four hour precipitation group - point five three inches, temperature positive, temperature nineteen point four degrees celsius, dewpoint positive, dewpoint thirteen point nine degrees celsius.						DATE/TIME 09/11/01 1151 UTC			
	FIRST REPORT SUBSEQUENT TO ACCIDENT: METAR La Guardia, Flushing, New York, 0951 EDT, wind three four zero degrees at nine knots, visibility one zero statute miles, few clouds at one thousand, scattered twenty five thousand, temperature two two degrees celsius, dew point one three degrees celsius, altimeter three zero one three; remarks - automated station with weather discriminator, sea level pressure two zero four, smoke, few clouds one thousand, smoke plume drifting southeast, temperature positive, temperature twenty two point two degrees celsius, dewpoint positive, dewpoint thirteen point three degrees celsius.						DATE/TIME 09/11/01 1351 UTC			
12. ATS PERSONNEL INVOLVED	NAME	FACILITY	OPERATING POSITION			CHECK IF EYEWITNESS				
	Stephen Roebuck	*(SR)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 47 Radar						
	Richard Beringer	(RB)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 47 Radar Associate						
	Peter Zalewski	(ZP)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 46 Radar						
	Brazalino Martins	(NO)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 38 Radar						
	Shirley Kula	(SO)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 38 Radar Associate						
	David McGlaflin	(CC)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 09 Radar						
	Glen Poncet	(PN)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 09 Radar Associate						
	Maria Moran	(ET)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 10 Radar Associate						
	Michael Royer	(RY)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 10 Radar						
	Thomas Roberts	(RT)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 39 Radar						
	William Smith	(PU)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 36 Radar						
	Scott Johnson	(JO)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 36 Radar Associate						
	Jonathan Schippiani	(SH)	Boston ARTCC	Area C Operations Supervisor						
Donald Larson	(LN)	Boston ARTCC	Sector 10 Radar							
13. SIGNATURE OF FACILITY CHIEF Heather Hemdal 										

Sheet 2.

ZBW-ARTCC-148
-AAL11.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT (Continuation Sheet)		1 REPORT DATE November 13, 2001	2 REPORT NO. ZBW-ARTCC-148
		3 NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY Boston (ZBW) ARTCC	
		14. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT (including control or other services provided by ATS facilities, and emergency action taken.)	

1242 - Unknown New York ARTCC Sector advises 20RA that United Airlines Inc. Flight 175 (UAL175) heard a suspicious transmission when they were leaving Boston.

6. Flight Crew, Continued.

NAME	POSITION	ADDRESS (CITY AND STATE)	FATALITY
Kathleen Nicosia	Flight Attendant	Unknown	X
Betty Ong	Flight Attendant	Andover, Massachusetts	X
Jean Roger	Flight Attendant	Longmeadow, Massachusetts	X
Dianne Snyder	Flight Attendant	Westport, Massachusetts	X
Madeline Sweeney	Flight Attendant	Acton, Massachusetts	X

12. ATS Personnel Involved, Continued.

NAME	FACILITY	OPERATING POSITION
Gregory Taccini	(TF) Boston ARTCC	Sector 47 Radar
Mark O'Neil	(MO) Boston ARTCC	Sector 47 Radar Associate
Myron Smith	(RS) Boston ARTCC	Sector 39 Radar Associate
Henry White	(WE) Boston ARTCC	Sector 22 Radar
Stephen Schmalz	(ST) Boston ARTCC	Sector 21 Radar
Karan Waggoner	(KT) Boston ARTCC	Sector 05 Radar
Alan Miller	(TV) Boston ARTCC	Sector 46 Radar Associate
William Dean	(WD) Boston ARTCC	Sector 20 Radar Associate
John Hartling	(HT) Boston ARTCC	Sector 20 Radar
Terry Biggio	(OE) Boston ARTCC	Operations Manager In Charge
Daniel Bueno	(BD) Boston ARTCC	Supervisory Traffic Management Controller In Charge
Joseph Cooper	(OP) Boston ARTCC	Traffic Management Departure Spacing
Colin Scoggins	(CS) Boston ARTCC	Military Position

* Operating Initials

*Crew 11 + passengers 70 + alleged hijackers 0 = 81 persons OR
Crew 11 + passengers 65 + alleged hijackers 5 = 81 persons*

There are 11 people missing from the FAA Accident Report. This number would coincide with the total number of crew members; however, in the above report (sheet 1) it gives "number aboard aircraft 81," and then "number fatalities 81." Either there were no crew members on Flight AA11, or there were 6 passengers and 5 alleged hijackers missing, or there were 11 passengers missing. Basically, it is only the FAA and CNN that differ on the number of individuals on board Flight AA11.

Agency	Passengers	Crew	Hijackers	Fatalities
FBI passenger list	76	11	5	92
American Airlines passenger list	76	11	5	92
FAA Accident Report	?	?	?	81
NTSB docket	76	11	5	92
Air disaster database	76	11	5	92
CNN passenger list	80	11	5	96
NTSB Factual Report	76	11	5	92

The Non-show List of Flight AA11

The non-show list was released by the NTSB. It assists in an investigation; it shows who did not check in with luggage at the ticket desk, did not receive a boarding pass, and was not assigned a seat on the aircraft.

The document with the names of non-show passengers was entitled: "PENTTBOMB MC182 (OO:BS)" and was issued September 23, 2001, from an investigation conducted on September 17, 2001. According to the document details, the following are the FBI's theories.

During the early stages of the investigation, questions arose concerning the relatively low number of persons known to be aboard American Airlines (AA) Flight 11 on September 11, 2001. Theory One: The suspected hijackers and/or unknown associates purchased multiple tickets on the flight in an attempt to ensure the number of passengers aboard each flight remained tactically manageable. Theory Two: The suspected hijackers specifically chose Flight AA11 on September 11, 2001, knowing the passenger load was typically low. As a result of these theories, the FBI Dallas Division tasked itself to determine:

- (1) If the passenger count on Flight AA11 on September 11, 2001, was within normal limits
- (2) The number of persons who cancelled reservations prior to departure (cancellations)
- (3) The number of persons with reservations who did not arrive for Flight AA11 (no shows)
- (4) If any of the cancellations or no shows have any link to the suspected hijackers and/or associates.

Given the foregoing directives, the FBI in Dallas initially contacted the airline company to obtain the percentage of capacity for Flight AA11 on all Tuesday mornings beginning from January 9 to September 4, 2001, (passenger load). Upon receiving the data, it was determined the average passenger load for Flight AA11 on Tuesdays was 38%. It was further determined the average passenger load for Flight AA11 on September 11, 2001, was higher than normal at 53%. Based on the foregoing information, it was not apparent the suspected hijackers booked multiple tickets as a tactical strategy. Theory one and two were dropped.

Upon completing the passenger load analysis, the FBI in Dallas constructed a database (11/77 Database) containing "all available information on those persons with reservations or noted on the manifests for Flight AA11 on September 11, 2001." This

would mean the FBI was given additional lists: Flight manifest and boarding list, which was not made available to the public domain. The referenced database reflects those persons actually aboard (on board) the flight, persons who made reservations and were not physically aboard the flights (non-show), and those persons who cancelled reservations prior to departure (cancellations). Information obtained from the airline reservation records indicated:

- 164 reservations made
- 65 persons cancelled
- 82 persons were on board
- 17 persons were non-show

Note the “PENTTBOMB MC182 (OO:BS)” report mention 82 persons were on board. This contradicts the official FBI passenger list given earlier; specifically their flash card which gives 81 persons on board. As an additional peculiarity, the FBI note 7 individuals reserved seats through the same travel agency in Pakistan. The agency name and address is redacted; the 9/11 Commission however state this agency to be Intervia Travel Agency. The FBI followed up this investigation with the travel agency, but we have no information of the result. The 7 peculiar non-shows were:

Cooper K.
Cooper S.
Cooper A.
Cooper P.
Noris E.
Noris O.
Noris W.

Following is a few sheets from the FBI’s list of cancellations and non-shows for Flight AA11 on September 11. A brief analysis of peculiarities is also given by us.

Sheet 1.

AA Group - On List and Cancellations for Flight						
FLT	Date	Board Pt	Dest	Time Left	Time Arrived	Airline
11	9/11/2001	BOS	LAX	7:45 AM	10:59 AM	AA
Name	Seat	Notes	Confirmed	PNR	Lead #	
BENOIT, MARILYN		FF AA BX97788 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 1:28PM, 9/10/01		BROMFJ	FA-4	
MELLO, CHRISTOPHER		SEAT 29G; FF AA 81K6M40 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 9:06AM, 9/10/01		JRURWS	FA-4	
KINNEE, CAROLE		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 11:43PM, 9/9/01		EHQZPD	FA-4	
KINNEE, ROBERT J		FF AA W901950 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 7:07AM, 8/23/01		EYJXFP	FA-4	
LANGTON, CHRISTOPHER		FF AA 226137 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 4:13PM, 8/17/01		JESJQP	FA-4	
COLE, ANDREW		FF AA 644JH70		BUFGBM	FA-4	
HALPERN, MICHAEL		FF AA X250116 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 12:08PM, 9/4/01		JZGJPK	FA-4	
CARLINO, ANDREW R		FF AA 161L7Y6 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 2:42PM, 9/7/01		GOYBUR	FA-4	
KOZLOSKI, CHRIS		(SEAT 25H) FF AA 1PV1638 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 5:06PM, 8/30/01		JATNZF	FA-4	
BRIGHAM, KRISTOPHER		FF AA 77PY560 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 3:20PM, 9/7/01		ENSCJJ	FA-4	
FREDERICK, SARAJANE		FF AA 8BC2422 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 10:50AM, 8/10/01		DIKMAE	FA-4	
ANDERS, DAVID		FF AA 24Y33K6 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 7:05AM, 9/8/01		BOVBKN	FA-4	
CUCCINELLO, THELMA		(SEAT 29J) REBOOKED IN HCYLWQ; 8:41AM, 8/23/01		HSCQFP	FA-4	
CURTIS, MARK		FF AA XM15608 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 3:00PM, 9/4/01		EABCTF	FA-4	
ANGELL, LYNN		FF AA KJ66928 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 7:30PM, 8/27/01		CUFNSG	FA-4	
BENDFELDT, JOHN		FF AA 4087914 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 2:32PM, 9/10/01		EBBHWV	FA-4	
MACFARLANE, SETH		(SEAT 38) CANCELLED RESERVATION - 6:34AM, 9/11/01		CIQBNO	FA-4	
SHARMA, DHRUV		SEAT 10H; MR; FF AA VTK2666 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 11:59AM, 8/31/01		SECRJO	FA-4	

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Peculiarities in Sheet 1

1. Mello Ch. is shown as being a cancelled name; however, in the FBI and AA passenger list he is assigned a seat number: 11B.
2. Cuccinello Thelma is depicted as being "rebooked;" in the FBI and AA passenger list this passenger is assigned a seat number: 27J.
3. Angell Lynn is shown as being a cancelled name; however, in the FBI and AA passenger list this passenger is assigned a seat number: 8B.

Sheet 2.

AA Group - On List and Cancellations for Flight AA 11

FLT	Date	Board Pt	Dest	Time Left	Time Arrived	Airline			
11	9/11/2001	BOS	LAX	7:45 AM	10:59 AM	AA			
Name	Seat	Notes	Confirmed	PNR	Lead #				
TREMBLEY, STEVEN		PSPT 9740587/CH/ DOB 4/19/74; AA FF 30P0W32 CANCELLED RESERVATION; 5:30PM, 7/18/01		CXGMVK	FA-4				
SMITH, MARTHA		FF AA 60YL666 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 7:13AM, 1/9/01		WVXMCJ	FA-4				
CASWELL, CAROLYN		AA 09B64M0 CANCELLED RES; PSGR NOT ADVISED OF SKED CHANGE & ARRIVED BOS TOO LATE TO CHK IN FOR AA 11; 6:33AM, 9/11/01		JMNOTI	FA-4				
CUNNINGHAM, BRAD		PURCHASED TICKET, 16:57PM, 8/17/01 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 9:29AM, 9/5/01		CNUWHP	FA-4				
KAMNARK, VUT		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 2:26AM, 6/27/01		UDHMSE	FA-4				
LEUNG, CHUNG MING		CANCELLED RESERVATION; 8:09PM, 9/5/01		FQXNGX	FA-4				
WONG, TZE ON ANDY		CANCELLED RESERVATION; 8:09PM, 9/5/01		FQXNGX	FA-4				
VALLANTE, JODI		CANCELLED RESERVATION; 2:11PM, 9/5/01		HLHWCC	FA-4				
WERNER, THOMAS		CANCELLED RESERVATION; 2:44PM, 9/5/01		DEIYKI	FA-4				
RIKER, HARLAND		FF AA EE26452 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 1:38PM, 4/3/01		TQNFZD	FA-4				
HAMRE, BLAKE		SEAT 10J CANCELLED RESERVATION - 11:59AM, 8/31/01		SECRJO	FA-4				
W, S		CHEAP SEATS TRAVEL CANCELLED RESERVATION DUE TO NO SHOW PREVIOUS SEGMENT; 9:56AM, 9/10/01		HNVXHV	FA-4				
SEIJO, EDWARD		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 11:04AM, 7/12/01		EUKOCY	FA-4				
MONTOYA, ANTONIO		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 3:19PM, 9/10/01		DHKKWT	FA-4				
CASWELL, CAROLYN		FF AA 09B64M0 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 6:33AM, 9/11/01		JMNOTI	FA-4				
BRUCK, L		CANCELLED, 8/28/01		CBSQGI	FA-4				
BURLINGHAM, ROBERT		(SEAT 22B) FF AA WV23554 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 8:45AM, 8/17/01		HJOHUD	FA-4				
WONG, GORDON		FF QF 2057144 CANCELLED RESERVATION - 11:03PM, 4/25/01		UAXOMP	FA-4				

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Peculiarities in Sheet 2

The airline notice for passenger Caswell Carolyn in the above list: "Passenger cancelled because she was not advised of scheduled change and arrived at Boston too late to check in for Flight AA11." This would coincide with the BTS records that Flight AA11 was cancelled on 9/11; if it was not cancelled entirely that day, there definitely was a change happening to that flight.

Sheet 3.

AA Group 1001 List and Cancellations for 9/11/01									
FLT	Date	Board Pt	Dest	Time Left	Time Arrived	Airline			
11	9/11/2001	BOS	LAX	7:45 AM	10:59 AM	AA			
Name	Seat	Notes	Confirmed	PNR	Lead #				
ROSS, RICHARD				HWKRTX	FA-4				
HAEGG, LARS		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 9:00AM, 8/31/01 PSPT 0004243-27; ISSUED KRISTIANSAND		JSRTPC	FA-4				
RYAN, JOSEPH		CANCELLED RESERVATION, 12:30PM, 8/31/01 FF AA 58CF532		ILOBVG	FA-4				
ANGELL, DAVID		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 3:37AM, 8/8/01 FF AA KK01116		CUFNSG	FA-4				
DOMINGUEZ, ALBERTO		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 7:30PM, 8/27/01		BZWBKC	FA-4				
GIPSON, JAMES		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 7:46AM, 9/11/01		JOFMMW	FA-4				
DUFFIELD, TOM		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 3:45PM, 9/10/01		CXNZWW	FA-4				
HENDERSON, SARAH		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 10:55PM, 9/10/01		UEDTRJ	FA-4				
LEUTHEUSER, EDWARD		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 00:12AM, 5/2/01 PSPT 153482249, US		UCSOPJ	FA-4				
LEUTHEUSER, SUE		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 2:52PM, 5/1/01 PSPT 159575562, US		UCSOPJ	FA-4				
SUAREZ, XAVIER		CANCELLED RESERVATION - 2:52PM, 5/1/01		JJSMEY	FA-4				
ALSHEHRI, WAIL	02A	CANCELLED RESERVATION - 5:27PM, 9/10/01; "ARC NUMBER DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR THIS FARE" ON FLT	YES	HKGTVB	FA-4				
ALSHEHRI, WALEED	02B	TICKET PURCHASED 17:57PM, 8/26/01. DIVIDED QCG1DBU 1757 28AUG01 IHTTLK ON FLT	YES	IHTTLK	FA-4				
MORABITO, LAURA	02D	TICKET PURCHASED, 17:57PM, 8/26/01, DIVIDED QCG1DBU 1757/26AUG01 HKGTVB ON FLT		CCPBZJ	FA-2				
RETIK, DAVID	02H	ONEWORLD AIRLINE EMPLOYEE ON COMPANY BUSINESS ON FLT		EPPSDT	FA-2				
ROSS, RICHARD	02J	ON FLT		DNOSNC	FA-2				
NEWELL, RENEE	03A	ON FLT - AA EMPLOYEE AA EMPLOYEE		JQAAPX	FA-2				
BOUCHARD, CAROL	03B	ON FLT - AA EMPLOYEE		JQCROO	FA-2				

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9/11 Personal Privacy

Peculiarities in sheet 3

1. Angell David is shown as being a cancelled name; however, in the FBI and AA passenger list this passenger is assigned a seat number: 8A.
2. Dominguez Alberto is shown as being a cancelled name; however, in the FBI and AA passenger list this passenger is assigned a seat number: Seat 11J.
3. Suarez Xavier is shown as being a cancelled name; however, in the FBI and AA passenger list this passenger is assigned a seat number: 34J.

Timeline of Flight AA11

Many official reports and/or video footage contradict each other as to the time Flight AA11 crashed into the WTC1.

- 08:45 a.m.: FAA Air Traffic Operations Centre

At 08:35 a.m., Air Traffic-Operations Manager Terry Biggio of Boston ARTCC advised ROC Ops Officer Barry O'Connor that the pilot "keyed mike while threat was being made in the cockpit." And then the timeline records how "Crew subsequently turned transponder off." The FAA Air Traffic Operations Centre takes CNN's reports as factual on the time Flight AA11 crashed into the WTC1 as being reported at 08:45 a.m.

0835E: Air Traffic-Operations Manager Terry Biggio of Boston ARTCC advised ROC Ops Officer Barry O'Connor:

ack **AA11, B767**, BOS-LAX at 0813E and 50 seconds
of Cambridge VOR, vicinity of Albany, VOR

Flight Level 290

Frequency 126.82

Pilot keyed mike while threat was being made in the cockpit.

Crew subsequently turned transponder off.

Aircraft turned southbound.

0836 Conference Call started with

0836E: Regional Management Team (including Military Representative Commander Rick Perez USN) was notified of alleged hijacking during morning staff meeting.

0836E: Ops Officer Barry O'Connor notified FAA HQ ADA-30 (McKie).

0836E: Washington Tactical conference bridge was established by ADA-30 and transferred ANE ROC into the conference.

0836E: Civil Aviation Security Intelligence (ACI) (Smith) was added to the conference by ADA-30.

The following people were added to the above conference bridge by Barry O'Connor:

0836E: Tom Benson ANE-505 notified and added to conference.

0838E: Boston Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO) Mgr (Turano) notified and added to the conference.

0840E: ANE-700 Acting Mgr (Batts) notified and added to the conference.

0842: ANE-500 Acting Mgr (Garrabone) came to the Ops Center and was added to the conference.

Note: other participants added but not listed.

0845: CNN reporting aircraft crashed into World Trade Center

Subsequent news reports of another aircraft hitting World Trade Center and other activity in Washington and Pennsylvania.

Ops Officer monitored conferences bridge/CNN and made notes of additional events:

Possibly: **United 175 - hijacked in Eastern Region airspace. (Impact @ 9:06)**

Delta 1989 on ground Cleveland with flaps down.

American 77 - missing

0848 ROC

0905: Washington Primary conference bridge was established with ANE-700 division.

0908E: Four tertiary (internal) conference bridges were set up for (2) ANE-500 and (2) ANE-700, and several others.

0850 Another Conf Center Activated (Tactical Net Set Up)
0852 MOC activated

0854 AEA notified - info put on automated system.

*Inter
Security
Intelligence Watch - Smith
ANE - ROC
Duration 1.2.2001-835-4*

- 08:44 a.m.: French documentary

A well-known French documentary (capturing the crash) was given to the mainstream media the following day. The footage clearly reflects the time of Flight AA11 crashing into the WTC1 as 08:44 a.m.

- 08:45 a.m.: Operations Centre Terrorist Attacks (NY-DC 9/11/01)

Chronology ADA-30, Operations Center Terrorist Attacks NY-DC 9/11/01

TIME	Remarks
0835	Received call ANE/Barry of possible hijack AAL11, B767, Bos-Lax, pilot keying mike and intruder in cockpit,* stating Don't move or I'll kill you.
0836	ACI/Smith conf with ANE ROC and command center.
0840	Received via conf with ANE/ROC Acft heading toward JFK.
0842	Via conference with ANE ROC reported a flight attendant has been stabbed.
0844	Via conference with ANE ROC reportedly a passenger had been shot.
0845	Received a report via conf with ANE ROC that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center in New York City.
0850	[REDACTED]
0852	MOC activated.
0854	CNN televised that an a/c had hit the World Trade Center in New York.
0859	CNN televised that 2 a/c had World Trade Center.
0920	[REDACTED]
0924	AGL ROC reported AAL77, b752, from IAD to LAX, 10E York, Ky at FL350 disappeared from radar at 1256Z.
0930	Smith on duty.
0940	[REDACTED]
0935	Channel 9 televised that an a/c had hit the Pentagon.
0915	Contacted Smith to come in for assistance.
0945	Contacted Corcoran/Lewis to come in for assistance.
0946	Computer # 2 OTS,
1036	[REDACTED]
0935	Johnson in facility.
0945	FAA Building Evacuated.
0958	Lewis/Corcoran in facility.
1045	Gordon/Corcoran relocating to RTS. Ground stop on all US Air Carriers @ 1017
1040	[REDACTED]
1052	[REDACTED]
1115	Gordon will keep in touch while enroute to RTS.
1117	Article being televised a/c hit Pittsburgh
1120	1 st Cadre enroute to RTS.
1122	ANS activated to inform Level 1's Cadre has been activated.
1130	Maggie Rolls attempted to get back into bldg but was unsuccessful.
1145	Evans in facility.
1150	Conf AOA-1/ADA-1 with S-2, American CEO, Delta CEO, and United CEO.
1155	Newby in facility.
1200	Previous fire reported at IAD not on arpt property.
1215	[REDACTED]
1227	Ans stopped and cancelled.
1238	[REDACTED]

- 08:46 a.m.: NORAD

American Airlines Flight 11 - Boston enroute to Los Angeles	
FAA Notification to NEADS	0840*
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis Air National Guard Base, Falmouth, Mass. Two F-15s)	0846**
Fighters Airborne	0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 1)	0846 (estimated)***
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location	Aircraft not airborne/153 miles

- 08:46 a.m.: Seismic data

Seismic Observations during September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attack


Won-Young Kim

Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University,
Palisades, N. Y. 10964, USA


and

Gerald R. Baum

Environmental Geology and Mineral Resources Program,
Maryland Geological Survey



- 08:46:26 a.m.: Brooklyn Tunnel footage (civilian video)
- 08:46:40 a.m.: NTSB



*National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Flight path study of Flight AA11 via the FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centre (ARTCC)
(February 15, 2002)*

- 08:51 a.m.: FAA Accident Report

This report (given earlier) records the weather at the time of the accident and has Flight AA11 crash at 08:51 a.m.

SYNOPTIC TIMELINE OF FLIGHT AA11


Departure / Crash

- Departure
CANCELLED TO FLY
07:59 a.m.
08:00 a.m.
- Bureau & Department of Transportation
FBI
NTSB/FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centre

- Crash
 - 08:44 a.m. French documentary (September 11, 2001)
 - 08:46 a.m. NORAD (September 18, 2001)
 - 08:46:26 a.m. Brooklyn Tunnel footage (civilian video)
 - 08:46 a.m. Seismic Data Columbia University
 - 08:46:40 a.m. NTSB / FAA Study Report (February 15, 2002)
 - 08:49 a.m. 9/11 Commission Report (p.285)
 - 08:51 a.m. FAA Accident Report (November 13, 2001)
 - 09:00 a.m. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secret Service ⁹

⁹ Declassified in December 12, 2008.

Cockpit Voice Recorder & Flight Data Recorder



Attorney General John Ashcroft testified before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States in April 13, 2004. He went on to say that the electronic flight data and voice recorder boxes of the four hijacked planes had not been found. That statement was overtaken by events later in the day when the so-called black boxes were found at two of the crash sites: The Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania site.



Mr. Giuliani holds up a photo of an airliner flight recorder, known as a “black box,” as he appeals to the public in New York, Wednesday, September 12, 2001, for help in locating the devices carried on the planes that crashed into the World Trade Centre on Tuesday.
©Associated Press/David Karp

The Flight Data Recorder is designed to retain information on the manoeuvring, operating status and condition of an aircraft. The Cockpit Voice Recorder retain the final 30 minutes of conversation in the cockpit.

The black box for Flight AA11 “was never found,” the 9/11 Commission reported. However, this statement is overtaken by Nicholas Demasi, who was a ground zero first responder.

“At one point, I was assigned to take Federal Agents around the site to search for the black boxes from the planes. There were a total of four. We found three.”

Mr. Demasi does not elaborate further, nor has any other first responder corroborated his account.

Reporter Dan Rather from *CBS News* had reported that ex-Mayor Giuliani notified of a Flight Recorder found in the tower complex.¹⁰ However, 5 minutes later, the same reporter redacts his report in a later video.¹¹

Whatever the case may be, no transcripts or data from any black box from Flight AA11 has ever been released, except for the transcript of the Air Traffic Controllers.

¹⁰ [<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZWByHSCUwY>]

¹¹ [http://www.911myths.com/index.php/The_Black_Boxes] / [<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TGEtoALGyCY>]

Airport Security on September 11

The airports and airline companies which will concern us in this section are those where four flights lifted off from and were involved in the attacks on September 11, 2001.

American Airlines 11	Boston Logan International Airport
United Airlines 175	Boston Logan International Airport
American Airlines 77	Dulles International Airport
United Airlines 93	Newark Liberty Airport

From the FAA Administrator's Fact Book (July 2001) statistics are given for aviation activity. From January to May 2001 among the fifty busiest Airport Traffic Control Towers, Boston Logan is ranked the 11th busiest tower; Dulles International is ranked the 16th busiest tower; and, Newark Liberty is ranked the 19th busiest tower.

No legal FAA holiday was reported on September 11, 2001; therefore all personnel were at their designated station.

USAToday

Ex-employee says FAA warned before 9/11 November 24, 2006

Ex-employee says FAA warned before 9/11 - USATODAY.com

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Ex-employee says FAA warned before 9/11

Updated 11/24/2006 12:18 AM ET

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By H. Darr Beiser, USA TODAY

"Immediately (after 9/11), numerous government officials from FAA as well as other government agencies made defensive statements such as, 'How could we have known this was going to happen?' " Bogdan Dzakovic testified later before the 9/11 Commission. "The truth is, they did know."

By Catherine Rampell, USA TODAY

From 1995 to 2001, Bogdan Dzakovic served as a team leader on the Federal Aviation Administration's Red Team. Set up by Congress to help the FAA think like terrorists, the elite squad tested airport security systems.

In the years leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Dzakovic says, the team was able to breach security about 90% of the time, sneaking bombs and submachine guns past airport screeners. Expensive new bomb detection machines consistently failed, he says.

The team repeatedly warned the FAA of the potential for security breaches and hijackings but was told to cover up its findings, Dzakovic says.

Eventually, the FAA began notifying airports in advance when the Red Team would be doing its undercover testing, Dzakovic says. He and other Red Team members approached the Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General, the General Accounting Office and members of Congress about the FAA's alleged misconduct regarding the Red Team's aviation security tests. No one did anything, he says.

Then came 9/11.

"Immediately (after 9/11), numerous government officials from FAA as well as other government agencies made defensive statements such as, 'How could we have known this was going to happen?' " Dzakovic testified later before the 9/11 Commission. "The truth is, they did know."

About a month after 9/11, he filed a complaint with the Office of the Special Counsel, the government agency that investigates whistle-blower cases. It alleged that the FAA had covered up Red Team findings. A subsequent Department of Transportation Inspector General's report, ordered by the OSC in response to Dzakovic's complaint, concluded that the "Red Team program was grossly mismanaged and that the result was a serious compromise of public safety."

After filing his complaint, Dzakovic was removed from his Red Team leadership position. He now works for the Transportation Security Administration, which has responsibility for airport security. His primary assignments include tasks such as hole-punching, updating agency phonebooks and "thumb-twiddling," he says. At least he hasn't received a pay cut, he says. He makes about \$110,000 a year for what he describes as "entry-level idiot work."

TSA spokesman Darrin Kayser would not comment on Dzakovic's allegations that he was retaliated against for being a whistle-blower. He said in an e-mail, "While TSA transitioned functions out of FAA, many employees were doing work outside of their pre-9/11 duties. Once TSA was established, Mr. Dzakovic did find a productive position within the agency and has been a valued contributor in our efforts to provide the highest level of security in all modes of transportation."

Posted 11/23/2006 8:51 PM ET

Updated 11/24/2006 12:18 AM ET

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WHISTLE-BLOWERS TELL TALES

- Speaking out:** Whistle-blowers tell of cost of conscience | Ex-employee says FAA warned before 9/11
- Paying the price:** 'Privilege' blocks fired translator from suing FBI | 'They treat a whistle-blower like a virus'

*Fair Use: For more information see footnote. ¹²

¹² [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml]

The FAA had been implementing red teams ¹³ since the tragic event of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Red teams conduct tests at about 100 U.S. airports annually. Tests were on hiatus after September 11, 2001 and resumed in 2003.

The FAA use of red teaming revealed severe weaknesses in security at Logan International Airport in Boston. Some former FAA investigators, who participated on these teams, felt that the FAA deliberately ignored the results of the tests and that this resulted in part in the terrorist attack.

Archive



NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

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Second public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Statement of Bogdan Dzakovic to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

May 22, 2003

Good afternoon, it is an honor and a privilege to have been invited to speak at this hearing. My contribution is to explain, based on personal experience, how abuses of secrecy are a clear and present danger to homeland security. That occurs when secrecy sustains vulnerability to terrorism caused by government breakdowns.

I know this, based on seven years with the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Red Team, which conducted undercover tests on airport security through simulated terrorist attacks. Although we breached security with ridiculous ease up to 90% of the time, the FAA suppressed these warnings. Instead we were ordered not to write up our findings (in some cases) and not to retest airports where we found particularly egregious vulnerabilities to see if the problems had been fixed. Finally, the agency started providing advance notification of when we would be conducting our "undercover" tests and what we would be checking.

As background, after the bombing of Pan Am 103 a 1990 Presidential Commission directed the FAA to develop "measures to improve testing of security systems". This was the birth of the Red Team. The Red Team, by definition, is an adversary team designed to replicate tactics that terrorists might use against us.

With the crash of TWA 800 off New York City, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264) further reinforced this concept of a Red Team by stating in part, "...the Administrator [of FAA] shall conduct periodic and unannounced inspections of security systems of airports and air carriers to determine the effectiveness and vulnerabilities of such systems..."

Furthermore, the White House Commission in 1997 stated in part, "...Red Team type testing should also be increased by the FAA, and incorporated as a regular part of airport security action plans. Frequent, sophisticated attempts by these Red Teams to find ways to dodge security measures are an important part of

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Current News

The Commission has released its final report. [\[more\]](#)

The Chair and Vice Chair have released a statement regarding the Commission's closing. [\[more\]](#)

The Commission closed August 21, 2004. [\[more\]](#)

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¹³ When applied to intelligence work, red-teaming is sometimes called "alternative analysis."

finding weaknesses in the system and anticipating what sophisticated adversaries of our nation might attempt...."

As a former Team Leader of the Red Team it was my sole job to execute this mandate. Some of my colleagues and I, using Red Team type tactics, did find major vulnerabilities in aviation security. We reported these through our chain of command. The managers in FAA (including the highest offices in FAA) deliberately choose to ignore our warnings. This is particularly grievous in light of the ever-growing terrorist threat of which they were also aware. For example, FAA issued 15 terrorism warnings to the air carriers in the year prior to 9-11. On April 6, 2000 the Associate Administrator of FAA for Security stated in open testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation Security, "... [M]oreover, members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorism are present in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-established capability and infrastructures here...."

Then the terrorists attacked on September 11, 2001, killing nearly 3,000 people. Immediately afterwards, numerous government officials from FAA as well as other government agencies made defensive statements such as, "How could we have known this was going to happen?" The truth is, they did know. What happened on 9-11 was not a failure in the system, it was a system designed for failure. FAA very conscientiously and deliberately orchestrated a dangerous façade of security, ignoring the laws cited above. They knew how vulnerable aviation security was. They knew the terrorist threat was rising, but gambled nothing would happen if we kept the vulnerability secret and didn't disrupt the airline industry. Our country lost that bet.

There are serious indications that the FAA deceived the public about what happened on 9-11. On the afternoon of September 11, 2001, I was working in one of the FAA operations centers collecting information on details of what happened during the hijacking. We received information that a firearm was used on one of the hijacked aircraft. At the time I gave it little thought. If you are going to hijack an aircraft why not bring a firearm? I knew from working in the Red Team how easy it is to do. Several years earlier the FAA had canceled testing with firearms, after a national Red Team study found over two thirds made it past security.

That evening the Administrator of FAA requested an Executive Summary covering the day's activities, and this information about a gun was included in the Summary. Day's later, without any explanation or questioning of the Summary's author, the Administrator publicly announced that no guns had been used in the hijacking. Several months passed when the press resurfaced this issue. FAA's initial response was that no such Executive Summary existed. Later, when confronted with the document, FAA admitted the Executive Summary existed, but denied its accuracy. Sometime later I learned that another operations center also received a report that a firearm was used. They conducted a cursory investigation but did not talk to all the pertinent witnesses. There were also reports of a possible explosive threatened on a flight. I hope this Commission investigates and credibly determines whether the public was deceived, and if so, why.

In my case, about a month after 9-11, I filed a Whistleblower Disclosure against FAA with the United States Office of Special Counsel (OSC). Last year the Special Counsel found a substantial likelihood I was right, and ordered Secretary Mineta to investigate. OSC flunked the agency's first draft report, which I had attacked as a cover-up. This past March, the OSC accepted a second report from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which concluded that, "...the Red Team was grossly mismanaged and that the result was the creation of substantial and specific danger to public safety..." in connection with 9-11. The Special Counsel still flunked the report as failing to meet legal requirements, however, because it failed to address accountability for confirmed wrongdoers.

At the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks I was a 14 year veteran of the Security Division of the FAA. I started off as field agent and Federal Air Marshal based in a major metropolitan area, then served as a Team Leader in the Air Marshal program, and since 1995 I had served as a Team Leader in the Red Team. We were extraordinarily successful in destroying U.S. Flag commercial aircraft and killing large numbers of innocent people in these simulated attacks. This occurred with such regularity and ease as to present a frightening picture of the sorry state of aviation security on a worldwide basis, including our domestic airports. This was all prior to 9-11. Immediately after our Red Team warnings were vindicated, however, we were grounded. Later, I was removed from my position as a Red Team Leader with no explanation and placed in a career limbo.

What was of even more concern to me was that the individuals who occupied the highest seats of authority in FAA were fully aware of this highly vulnerable state of aviation security and did nothing. My immediate boss reported directly to the Associate Administrator for Aviation Security; and he reported directly to the Administrator of FAA. In 1998, I sent a memo through my chain of command to the Administrator of FAA attempting to have these issues addressed. The Administrator didn't even have the courtesy to acknowledge receipt. The Secretary of Transportation did respond to my letter but there was no follow-up.

Coupled with this; virtually every expert on terrorism for several years prior to 9-11 had been screaming about the ever growing threat to the United States by a new breed of terrorists willing to inflict mass casualties on civilians. The first major wake-up call occurred in 1994, when terrorists planned on blowing up a dozen US commercial aircraft over the Pacific Ocean. This was thwarted by an accidental fire in the apartment where the bombs were being constructed. The second major wake-up call occurred in 1995 when terrorists planned on crashing an airliner into the Eiffel Tower in Paris. Only quick and decisive action by French commandos prevented this disaster. There were also additional indicators.

The specific issues I outlined in my Whistleblower Disclosure included the following:

1. In 1996 I worked on a 6-month project in which we injected simulated bombs through the checked baggage system at a major European airport. We were successful in getting 31 out of 31 of these simulated explosives on US commercial aircraft. No action was taken to remedy this security problem and we have never been back to

this airport to re-test security. In fact our results were so deplorable that FAA prevented us from testing in this manner at any foreign airport ever again.

2. In year 2000-01, in other testing conducted at a different major European airport the Red Team obtained equally abysmal results, even though this airport had the latest bomb detection equipment. FAA Security management was equally remiss in not correcting these problems.
3. In 1998, I was the team leader testing the access control system at a major domestic airport. We were successful in breaching their multi-million dollar computer controlled access system approximately 85% of the time. No action was taken to remedy this security problem and we have never been back to this airport (or any airport) to re-test access control security.
4. In 1998, the Red Team completed extensive testing of screening checkpoints at a number of domestic airports. Basically our test results were the inverse of the results FAA field offices achieved (i.e.: where a field office reported an airport having a 90% success rate in detecting FAA test objects; we would report a success rate of about 10%. In one case we even had documented an airport detection rate of about 3%).
5. In the 1997-8 time frame, I was the team leader for some testing at another major domestic international airport. Purely by accident we conducted testing at an extremely busy time when cruise ships were loading and unloading passengers at the same time. The airport was extremely overcrowded with people. Security simply broke down in these conditions. After failing all of our tests and reporting this fact through my chain of command, I reported this abhorrent state of security to my immediate manager. He ordered me not to make a written report on this, and to stop all further testing at this airport.
6. Since 1998, almost all of our domestic work had been limited to testing the CTX explosives detection machines. By August of 1999, our test results were so poor that my boss ordered us to no longer do surreptitious (i.e.: unannounced) testing. Instead, we were ordered to notify the appropriate FAA field office a couple of days before we were to commence our "secret" testing. My first 2 missions after receiving these instructions resulted in both of these airports achieving a 100% success rate regarding our testing. I stopped notifying the field after that, and the results returned to their normal low success rates.

There were also other major problem areas we identified in areas such as cargo security, Threat Image Projection (TIP), and the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS). Apparently about half the hijackers on 9-11 were identified by CAPPS, but so what?

The bottom line of FAA's response to its Red Team findings is that the Red Team was gradually working its way out of a job. The more serious the problems in aviation security we identified, the more FAA tied our hands behind our backs and restricted our activities. All we were doing in their eyes was identifying and "causing" problems that they preferred not to know about.

Further details regarding my Whistleblower Disclosures are contained in my over 500 pages of documentation submitted to the OSC. I should also point out that I have not been the only person engaged in this Whistleblower process. A number of other former FAA and/or current Transportation Security Agency (TSA) employees from around the country also contributed statements and documentation supporting my allegations. Also, a couple of recently retired employees provided documentation. One of these (Brian Sullivan) provided a letter (among other items) written by an FAA Security Special Agent on May 18, 1999 to the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General (OIG) in which the agent stated, in part, "...as a result of this situation, Logan International Airport is in a critical state of non-compliance with Federal Aviation Security Regulations..." As you may recall, two of the aircraft that were hijacked on 9-11 left from this same airport. The IG took no credible action to investigate or correct these identified problems prior to 9-11, and they certainly took no action after 9-11.

Their statements are available in a public file at OSC, or through my attorneys at the Government Accountability Project (GAP). Their statements only are on the public record, because GAP did its own investigation with the witnesses and evidence the OIG ignored. While the OSC agreed with my general assessment that FAA Security was grossly mismanaged and operated in a manner that threatened public safety, there are additional items that need to be addressed. While the OSC agreed the new TSA's promises of reform "appear reasonable," that is not reassuring to me. Based on years of effort, I know the government's airport security bureaucracy is a master both of maintaining appearances, and of passive resistance to genuine reforms. Every one of the whistleblowers interviewed by GAP warned that the airports are not safer now than before 9-11. The main difference is that life is now more miserable for passengers.

After about two years working in the Red Team I became extremely concerned about this impending aviation security disaster and tried working through normal channels to have these issues addressed by FAA management. This proved to be a wasted effort, as with my 1998 letter to the FAA Administrator.

I then joined up with some other individuals from around the country, and we started working together on this problem. Steve Elson (a former Red Team member, now retired) and I went to the Department of Transportation's OIG. This too proved to be a wasted effort. A senior official in the Inspector General's Office actually explained to us that because of the political situation between the FAA and the IG's office, the IG couldn't take any action against FAA. The same person later told me that unless I gave him "...a dead body and a smoking gun, he can't do anything against FAA." Well, we now have nearly 3,000 dead bodies, a smoking cannon, and the IG still refuses to take action against FAA.

We then went to the General Accounting Office (GAO) and expressed our concerns to them. The GAO people we spoke to were extremely concerned about our revelations, but explained they have no authority to actually do anything. They get their marching orders directly from Congress. I learned later that the GAO has a long history of reports that documented the same sorry state of aviation security that we found on the Red Team.

We then visited a number of the offices of Senators and Representatives who were on the Transportation subcommittees that were supposed to oversee FAA Security, and provided them the same documentation about this dangerous state of aviation security. They too did nothing.

And so 9-11 happened. About a month later I filed my whistleblowing disclosure with OSC, which directed Secretary Mineta to report back on my charges. Mineta, in turn, ordered the IG to investigate my allegations. Over a year later the OSC announced the results of the investigation conducted by the IG. Keep in mind that this is the same IG's office that I had previously contacted prior to September 11, 2001.

The gist of the IG's investigation indicated agreement with my general allegations but "...did not disclose any evidence..." that supported any of my specific charges. If this had been a [simple] murder investigation, their report would read something like: Our investigation reveals that the victim was murdered, but we found no evidence that anyone actually committed the murder.

The reason that the IG didn't "disclose" any evidence that supported my specific allegations is not because they didn't have easy access to it. GAP's parallel investigation proved that. OIG simply didn't include in their investigative report any documentation that I provided to them. They also seized all the Red Team files, which contained much of the specific evidence for my charges. But they didn't mention the evidence, or explain what they did with it. They didn't include any derogatory statements that my witnesses provided. In fact; the IG didn't even interview many of my witnesses. In essence the OIG falsified the report on my whistleblowing disclosure. But there was still so much overwhelming evidence of FAA's dangerous culture of mismanagement that the IG had to admit enough shortcomings that the OSC supported my general allegation: FAA executed its Civil Aviation Security mission in a manner that, "...was a substantial and specific threat to public safety..."

So what happened after 9-11? Every government official with anything to say about it stated that 9-11 was due to intelligence failures. So instead of disemboweling the CIA and FBI, Congress disemboweled FAA Security and formed the Transportation Security Agency with billions of dollars of taxpayer's money. To do what, to fix a civil aviation security system that "wasn't" responsible for the government failures on 9-11 in the first place?

But what has TSA done? For one thing, not one person has been disciplined for mismanaging an agency that operated in a manner that was "a substantial and specific danger to public safety," contributing directly to the nearly 3,000 deaths on 9-11 as well as turning this country upside down. The OSC formally has agreed this is unacceptable. As a matter of fact, **many of these same managers have been promoted within TSA and are key players in how TSA executes its missions.** Those managers that didn't transfer to TSA are still with FAA, and are managing the FAA internal investigations/security mission and its hazardous materials mission in precisely the same way as it mismanaged its previous aviation security mission.

TSA on the other hand has a lot to answer for regarding the misuse of hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer's money, as well as very serious indicators that civil aviation security is little

better now than it was before 9-11. In fact, I hate to see it; but TSA is showing some of the very same symptoms that FAA did prior to 9-11, that the façade is more important than the reality. This is something that terrorists can (and probably will) easily exploit.

In fact, the final report into my charges is illegally being kept secret, off the public record. The law only permits publicly withholding classified information from reports into whistleblower charges. There was no classified information in the IG report, but FAA refused to let the Special Counsel have it without a promise to maintain secrecy because the report has "sensitive but unclassified" information. This is a new concept, which allows information to have the secrecy status of being classified without any of the corresponding procedural checks and balances. This free ride is used for information whose contents don't justify being marked as classified. It is ironic that a report confirming public safety threats from abuses of secrecy is being kept secret. That is another reason I am not confident things are getting safer.

As for my own situation, in a formal letter to the OSC, the current head of TSA has reported that I am and have been gainfully and productively employed by TSA and that I am fully contributing my talents to the TSA mission. During most of 2002, my primary job was punching holes in paper and putting orientation binders together (and other menial work) for the hundreds of newly hired TSA employees. My current job is even further removed from keeping bombs, weapons, and terrorists off planes.

In addition to how I've been treated; a number of current and former FAA employees contributed to my rebuttal to the IG investigation with a total of over 500 pages of documentation. One made the mistake of not requesting anonymity; and she (Carrie Hancasky) has been treated in a similar fashion as me. Ms. Hancasky has a flawless work record, high integrity, and is being punished just for doing her job (i.e.: honestly answering questions in a formal investigation). This was for just being a witness. Intimidation of a witness is the most repulsive thing I have seen these bureaucrats do, and is but one of the warning signs that little of substance has changed in our government since 9-11.

The bottom line is that if massive improvements are not made in the way the new Homeland Security Agency treats its employees, we are all going to be in a lot of danger -- not only from potential terrorists, but as federal employees from our own government. The next major terrorist attack can be thwarted, if there are highly motivated, appropriately trained individuals who are encouraged to use initiative and brains. It is counterproductive to beat employees down until they are afraid to raise serious issues about loopholes in our last line of defense. Unfortunately, we are tending toward the latter type of environment.

In fact, secrecy enforced by repression is being institutionalized through another new concept of unclassified secrecy called "Critical Infrastructure Information (CII), which can be virtually anything provided by industry to the Department to assist in the "War on Terrorism." If an employee blows the whistle with this unclassified CII evidence, it is a criminal act subject to immediate termination from the government, and up to a year


in jail. This new CII form of secrecy was passed as part of the Homeland Security Act. If it had been law when I blew the whistle, I could have been fired and be sitting in jail, instead of being vindicated and testifying today.

Lack of personal accountability for ALL levels of government service; repression of government professionals exercising the freedom to warn of security breakdowns caused by mismanagement; and abuses of secrecy as an excuse to cover up the government's own misconduct are three strikes against public safety. If those patterns persist, we are doomed to suffer more and more 9-11 tragedies. It is only a matter of time.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
The Commission closed on August 21, 2004. This site is archived.

*Statement of Bogdan Dzakovic
9/11 Commission (May 22, 2003)¹⁴*

Bogdan Dzakovic's claim of a weapon being on hijacked aircraft is substantiated and corroborated by witnesses and FAA reports.




FAA Memo

Regarding the above FAA memo extract, FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown in a phone interview with *WorldNetDaily* noted: "It was a first draft; there was no gun." She said a final draft of the Executive Summary, received by FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, does

¹⁴ [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing2/witness_dzakovic.htm]

not include the account of a gun being fired aboard the plane. Mrs. Brown refused to release the final draft arguing it was “protected information.”

This is not the only shooting incident that was being reported that day. Another report was leaked, stating a weapon and a bomb was on board Flight UA93 which crashed in Shanksville. Deena Burnett, the wife of passenger Thomas Burnett received 4 calls from her husband from Flight UA93. In the *CNN* description of these calls, Deena Burnett is reported only saying “that one passenger had been stabbed;” however, the chronology from Deena Burnett’s “Family Foundation Thomas Burnett” Website page describes the content of these calls, which is corroborated with crosschecking phone records on all calls from Flight UA93.



The screenshot shows the website for the Tom Burnett Family Foundation. The header features a blue star and red stripes on the left, and the text "TOM BURNETT FAMILY FOUNDATION" on the right. A left sidebar contains a menu with links: Home, About Us, Tom Burnett, Giving, Contact Us, and Resources. The main content area is titled "Transcript of Tom's last calls to Deena" in red. It lists two calls: a 6:27 a.m. call from Tom to Deena and a 6:31 call from Deena to 911. The transcript of the 6:27 call is as follows:

- Deena: Hello
- Tom: Deena
- Deena: Tom, are you O.K.?
- Tom: No, I'm not. I'm on an airplane that has been hijacked.
- Deena: hijacked?
- Tom: Yes, They just knifed a guy.
- Deena: A passenger?
- Tom: Yes.
- Deena: Where are you? Are you in the air?
- Tom: Yes, yes, just listen. Our airplane has been hijacked. It's United Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. We are in the air. The hijackers have already knifed a guy, **one of them has a gun**, they are telling us there is a bomb on board, please call the authorities. He hung up.

Below the transcript, it says "6:31 Deena calls 911".

Deena Burnett clearly tells how her husband told her that one of the hijackers “had a gun.” The other aircraft (Flight AA11) also had a weapon on board, which was used to shoot a passenger, an ex-Israeli Commando Daniel Lewin.

The first call Mrs. Burnett gets from her husband is at 06:27 a.m. pacific time, according to her chronology on her Website. (See below) This would mean it was 09:27 a.m. when her husband called her. The first call recorded from Flight UA93 reported on the company airline phone records was Mrs. Burnett’s husband, recorded at 08:30:32 a.m. INT (Indiana Time Zone), which would mean it was 09: 30:32 a.m.

United Airlines Flight #93
Telephone Calls
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
AIRCRAFT ID: I51721341



Time	Time Zone	Axis Call Id	Billed Card Type	Swiped Card	Name (Assigned Seat)	Destination Number	Last Dated Number	Manual Entry Ind	Validation Approval Code	RBS Id	RBS Id	Terminal Unit	Distrib Unit	Seat Location	Number Of Handoff	Open Id	Weight On Wheels	Duration Connect	Duration Operator	Sp Duration
8:30:32	INT	20010911103838	CS	8912889316542428	Thomas Burnett (4B)			T	Apprvd	059 FWY FT WAYNE	059	28	2	24 ABC	1		2	17	0	28
8:32:39	INT	20010911104110	AS	8914840999999998	Flight Attendant			F		026 FWY FT WAYNE	026	38	2	34 ABC	0		2	13	0	95
9:31:14	ET	20010911103848	AS	8914840999999998	Flight Attendant			F		059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	38	2	34 ABC	0		2	18	0	2
9:35:40	ET	20010911104776	AS	8914840999999998	Flight Attendant			F		091 BELV BELLEVILLE	026	38	1	33 DEF	1		2	12	0	353
9:35:48	ET	20010911104411	AS	8914840999999998	Flight Attendant			F		091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	38	2	34 ABC	0		2	100	0	4
9:35:56	ET	20010911104421	AS	8914840999999998	Flight Attendant			F		091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	37	2	33 ABC	0		2	100	0	4
9:36:10	ET	20010911104334	MC	5409970272076282	Mark Bingham (4C)			F	Apprvd	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	30	1	25 DEF	0		2	36	0	5
9:37:03	ET	20010911104639	MC	5409970272076282	Mark Bingham (4C)			F	Apprvd	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	026	30	1	25 DEF	1		2	16	0	166
9:37:41	ET	20010911118703	VI	4719240901140034	Jeremy Glick (1A)			F		091 BELV BELLEVILLE	065	32	1	27 DEF	8		2	14	0	7565
9:37:53	ET	20010911104573	CS	8912889316542428	Thomas Burnett (4B)			T	Apprvd	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	28	2	25 ABC	0		2	24	0	62
9:39:21	ET	20010911104661	VI	4019014000737215	Lauren Grandcolas (11D)			F	Apprvd	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	28	1	23 DEF	0		2	14	0	46
9:40:42	ET	20010911104717	VI	4019014000737215	Lauren Grandcolas (11D)			F	Apprvd	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	28	1	23 DEF	0		2	22	0	
9:41:20	ET	20010911104759	MC	5409970272076282	Mark Bingham (4C)			F	Apprvd	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	30	1	25 DEF	0		2	16	0	
9:41:34	ET	20010911104786	VI	4019014000737215	Lauren Grandcolas (11D)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	28	1	23 DEF	0		2	14	0	4
9:41:53	ET	20010911104853	MC	5409970272076282	Mark Bingham (4C)			F	Apprvd	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	30	1	25 DEF	0		2	33	0	3
9:42:03	ET	20010911104829	VI	4019014000737215	Lauren Grandcolas (11D)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	28	1	23 DEF	0		2	14	0	2
9:42:13	ET	20010911104881	VI	4719240901140034	Joseph DeLuca (2B)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	31	1	26 DEF	0		2	20	0	14
9:42:25	ET	20010911104873	VI	4019014000737215	Lauren Grandcolas (11D)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	28	1	23 DEF	0		2	13	0	3
9:42:44	ET	20010911104883	DC	3886550918305	Todd Beamer (10C)			F	Denied	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	37	1	32 DEF	0		2	4	0	
9:42:44	ET	20010911104959	DC	3886550918305	Todd Beamer (10C)			F	Denied	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	37	1	32 DEF	0		2	45	0	
9:42:45	ET	20010911104913	VI	4019014000737215	Lauren Grandcolas (11D)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	28	1	23 DEF	0		2	14	0	3
9:43:03	ET	20010911105195	VI	4719240901140034	Joseph DeLuca (2B)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	31	1	26 DEF	0		2	15	0	130
9:43:24	ET	20010911104956	VI	4019014000737215	Lauren Grandcolas (11D)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	28	1	23 DEF	0		2	7	0	
9:43:44	ET	20010911105042	VI	4019014000737215	Lauren Grandcolas (11D)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	28	1	23 DEF	0		2	25	0	7
9:43:46	ET	20010911105555	DC	3886550918305	Todd Beamer (10C)			F	Denied	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	37	1	32 DEF	0		2	3	0	
9:43:46	ET	20010911103882	DC	3886550918305	Todd Beamer (10C)			F	Denied	091 BELV BELLEVILLE	091	37	1	32 DEF	8	PJ	2	77	3925	
9:44:23	ET	20010911105201	CS	8912889316542428	Thomas Burnett (4B)			T	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	28	2	25 ABC	0		2	20	0	54
9:45:37	ET	20010911105450	AX	372763181001002	Walenska Martinez (10F)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	38	2	34 ABC	0		2	138	0	
9:46:05	ET	20010911105429	VI	4719240901140034	Linda Gronlund (2A)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	31	1	26 DEF	0		2	28	0	71
9:47:57	ET	20010911105619	VI	4270890046957056	Cecese Lyles (Crew)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	36	2	32 ABC	0		2	35	0	56
9:48:48	ET	20010911105555	VI	4719240901140034	Joseph DeLuca (2B)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	31	1	26 DEF	0		2	9	0	
9:49:12	ET	20010911106114	DS	6011002390640779	Marion Britton (12B)			T	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	065	37	2	33 ABC	3		2	9	0	232
9:49:30	ET	20010911105654	VI	4118212018643637	Sandra Bradshaw (Crew)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	059	38	1	33 DEF	0		2	15	0	
9:50:04	ET	20010911117290	VI	4118212018643637	Sandra Bradshaw (Crew)			F	Apprvd	059 COLM COLOMBUS	065	38	1	33 DEF	3		2	33	0	470
9:53:43	ET	20010911117288	DS	6011002390640779	Honor Walino (11F)			T	Apprvd	CRPL CORAOPOLIS	065	37	2	33 ABC	0		2	11	0	289
9:58:00	ET			Cell Phone (941 823-2355)	Cecese Lyles (Crew)															2
9:58:00	ET			Cell Phone (732 241-6974)	Edward Felt (2D)															

Regardless of the 5 minute difference between Mrs. Burnett's chronology and the company airline phone record chronology, by 08:30 a.m., Flight UA93 was in trouble: This would mean just 2 minutes after it took off.

We will offer evidence that the aircraft had a 1 minute delay in take-off; it taxied for 27 minutes then took off at 08:28 a.m., and not at 08:42:48 a.m., as the initial FAA report shows. With this fact in mind, the airline company phone records and Mrs. Burnett's phone recollection with her husband, substantiates that Flight UA93 took off at 08:28 a.m., and not at 08:42:48 a.m.

BTS	FAA	FBI	9/11 Commission
08:28 a.m.	08:42:48 a.m.	08:42 a.m.	08:42 a.m.

14 minutes and 48 seconds difference

Two reports from passengers mentioned firearm was on board two hijacked flights; this was a pattern that had never even been touched by the FBI and only hinted on by small mainstream media outlets. If the reports had been dwelled upon with more scrutiny, possibly United Airlines and American Airlines would not have been granted the following budget that was entered as an Act "PUBLIC LAW 107-42-SEPT. 22, 2001," from the United States Congress directly after September 11, 2001.

Public Law 107-42
107th Congress

An Act

Sept. 22, 2001
[H.R. 2926]

To preserve the continued viability of the United States air transportation system.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

Air
Transportation
Safety and
System
Stabilization Act.
49 USC 40101
note.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act”.

TITLE I—AIRLINE STABILIZATION

49 USC 40101
note.
President.
Terrorism.

SEC. 101. AVIATION DISASTER RELIEF.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall take the following actions to compensate air carriers for losses incurred by the air carriers as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001:

(1) Subject to such terms and conditions as the President deems necessary, issue Federal credit instruments to air carriers that do not, in the aggregate, exceed \$10,000,000,000 and provide the subsidy amounts necessary for such instruments in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.).

(2) Compensate air carriers in an aggregate amount equal to \$5,000,000,000 for—

(A) direct losses incurred beginning on September 11, 2001, by air carriers as a result of any Federal ground stop order issued by the Secretary of Transportation or any subsequent order which continues or renews such a stoppage; and

(B) the incremental losses incurred beginning September 11, 2001, and ending December 31, 2001, by air carriers as a direct result of such attacks.

(b) EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.—Congress designates the amount of new budget authority and outlays in all fiscal years resulting from this title as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(e)). Such amount shall be available only to the extent that a request, that includes designation of such amount as an emergency requirement as defined in such Act, is transmitted by the President to Congress.

Note in the above Public Law Act, the recorded amount of \$5,000,000,000 compensation to the airlines of the planes involved in the hijackings as “a result of any Federal ground stop order issued by the Secretary of Transportation or any subsequent order which continues or renews such a stoppage.” This refers to an aviation order called “Scatana,”¹⁵ which was allegedly given by the Secretary of Transportation,

¹⁵ According to the Website of Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), Scatana was a “Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids (Short Title: SCATANA), by the FAA from 1986.” [http://ntl.bts.gov/ref/biblio/govsafe.html]

Norman Mineta, at 09:45 a.m. However, such an order for all commercial airlines to be grounded was never implemented, even in the afternoon at 14:30 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) as the following “Chronology ADA-30, Operations Centre Terrorist Attacks NY-DC 9/11/01” report acknowledges.

1428	AAL ROC return to bldg.
1430	Cusack on duty. Via ADA/Noel FAA is not activating Scatana, not shutting down any nav aids. Commercial flights are not expected to resume until 9/12 after 1200E.
1444	Corcoran, Cusack, Newby, Fawley AWP reports traffic.
1445	Computer room conf ended, will reestablish at 1530E, unkn if FAA will be added.
) 1450	Via AEA ROC/Comanche HIJACKED ACFT: AAL 11, B767, BOS-LAX, crashed into World Trade 92 POB all fatal; UAL 175, B767, BOS-LAX; AAL 77, B757, IAD-LAX crashed into NMCC 64 POB. UAL 93, B757, EWR-SFO, crashed south of Indian Lade Arpt, PA, UNKN POB, all fatal.
1455	Conf OST/Faherty with AOA/Rochelle ref AOA-1 call.

Page 2 of 2

Mr. Mineta made the air carriers (United Airlines and American Airlines) a humongous \$5,000,000,000 in compensation from the U.S. Congress, when he gave incorrect testimony regarding the implementation of “Scatana” at the 9/11 Commission Hearing. That “Scatana” was not implemented, and no shut down on Navigation Aids (“nav aids”) happened, was purely a business decision. There would have been implications of huge proportions towards the economy for all airline companies flying within the United States on that day, if such an order had been given.

According to NORAD: During a time of war or crisis (such as an attack from Russian Bombers) the commander of NORAD has the authority to declare an Air Defense Emergency (one of only two “EMERGCNs” or “Emergency Conditions”) and order the grounding of all commercial aircraft before implementing Security Control of Air Traffic And Navigation Aids (“Scatana”).

“Scatana” deactivates the entire U.S. air navigation system and transfers control of all air monitoring assets to NORAD, while they deploy their own much more sophisticated and combat-specific radar system, which is air-based and involves assets such as the Boeing E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) platform. These aircraft provide a much more accurate 3D map of the battlefield, and coordinate friendly aircraft in their actions against any threats.

If Mr. Mineta had given the order for all deactivation of air navigation system, then automatically, NORAD assumes control, as stated above, and two aircrafts (Flight AA77 and Flight UA93) would have been intercepted. But this did not happen, because “Scatana” was not implemented.

General Eberhart, who said he requested a “modified Scatana,” does not exactly say at what time or if it was actually executed. He does explain why he waited before

requesting a “modified Scatana,” in his interview in *The Washington Post* on June 17, 2004.¹⁶

EBERHART:

Scatana is a procedure that, as you say, allows us to take control of the air space. It’s a procedure that was designed, again, to counter the Soviet Union and their long-range bombers. It’s a procedure that if I had tried, and as the people approached me with, “Declare Scatana,” the problem was that we could not control the air space that day with the radars we had and all the aircraft that were airborne, 4,000 to 5,000 airplanes airborne. So if I suddenly, “We’ve got it, we will control the air space,” we would have had worse problems than we had that morning, because I cannot provide traffic de-confliction like the FAA has.

What mine is designed to do is we see a bomber coming from a long range, we tell everybody to get the aircraft down safely, then nothing flies and we control the air space. We are prepared to do that. But we’re not prepared suddenly to take control of the air space and say, “We have it,” because now we’re talking, in terms of safety and security of air travel, we’re talking about a bad situation getting worse.

The other thing, and I have the authority to do that. [Sic] But I have the authority to do it against an external threat; the second thing that’s very important to note, there are procedures in Scatana that are designed to counter long-range bombers.

For example, we’re supposed to turn off all the navigational aids. That morning, the last thing we wanted to do was turn off all the navigational aids. You turn them off so that the enemy bombers can’t use them. But we don’t want to turn them off so that the airplanes can’t land safely. We don’t want to turn them off so that law enforcement and ‘Flight For Life can’t fly.’

So what we did, and you said we executed it, but I think it’s very important that we note that when we executed it, we executed a modified Scatana and that’s what I told them is, ‘I will execute Scatana once you have a modified Scatana that clearly delineates the lines in the road and doesn’t cause a bad situation from getting worse.’ So our Scatana said, ‘Leave the nav aids on.’ Our Scatana said, ‘FAA, you still control the traffic that’s flying.’ Our Scatana said, ‘Law enforcement and ‘Flight For Life’ can continue to fly.’ We don’t want to ground them during this terrible tragedy, and then procedures for getting waivers to fly.

END OF COMMENT

¹⁶ [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49429-2004Jun17_5.html]

We see, by General Eberhart's account, that only a partial Scatana was implemented which was not even activated by 14:30 p.m. So why did Mr. Mineta tell the 9/11 Commission he gave an order that turns out to be so erroneous?

Bogdan Dzakovic's claim of "possible explosive threatened on a flight," can also be substantiated. According to the FAA Staff Report published in August 26, 2004, "Only Ahmed al-Haznawi was selected by CAPPs. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane after confirmation that Haznawi was on board." It is not certain what this comment actually signifies: If al-Haznawi was actually carrying some artefact in his bag that looked like explosives, then the bag was cleared and put on the flight where all bags are placed underneath the aircraft since al-Haznawi was already on board the aircraft. He was screened, most probably, though we do not have this on CCTV. However, this is what is understood.

Taken into account that al-Haznawi was suspected of carrying explosives is not a light comment to state, especially coming from the FAA. This would mean that either they created this story which later turned into a rumour that a bomb was on board Flight UA93, or al-Haznawi actually did raise suspicions of carrying explosives which he triggered by some mechanism on his person when the aircraft was in the air, and the explosives went off in the luggage area underneath the aircraft. This would definitely corroborate the following account which came from reporter Rick Earle (*ABC*) stating he spoke with a 911 operator in Greensburgh:

About 09:58 a.m., the 911 emergency centres received a cellular call from a man claiming to be a passenger on board Flight UA93. The caller told the operator the plane was being hijacked, and then relayed there had been an explosion on the aircraft; he saw a cloud of white smoke, then the line went dead.

If al-Haznawi actually passed through checkpoint security a triggering device, which went off as the aircraft was in the air, also corroborates the peculiar fact that additional debris from the aircraft was found 6 to 8 miles away from Shanksville. The second debris looked like something fell off the aircraft 6 miles away before it crashed. The FBI concluded, as did the NTSB, that this second debris was possible. They reported the debris was found in New Baltimore, 8 miles southeast; they even gave it a 9 knots wind which would be at 10.4 mph making this a 46 minute travel from Shanksville. What they found was "paper and thin nylon."

When a bag is screened for explosives, then the person the bag is owned by is held back from boarding until the proper authority clears baggage and passenger. This is standard universal aviation safety rules regardless which airline or from which country the suspected passenger is travelling on and from.

Still coming from the FAA Staff Report, note what is said regarding CCTV.

“Because Newark Airport, like Logan in Boston, did not use video cameras to monitor activities at security checkpoints, we could not establish with certainty how the five hijackers were processed when they passed through security screening.”

The FAA report states “five hijackers” as opposed to four hijackers on Flight UA93 from the FBI. Once again, this flight is packed to the brim with discrepancies and inconsistencies. The FAA Staff Report clearly states Newark Liberty Airport security selected Ahmed al-Haznawi to be “screened for explosives;” now let us read what ABC reported happened to Nawaf al-Hazmi as he went through security at Washington Dulles Airport where Flight AA77 was alleged to have taken off from and was involved in the Pentagon attack.

ABC News
July 21, 2004

The screenshot shows the ABC News website interface. On the left is a dark blue sidebar with white text for navigation: "FEATURED SERVICES", "INSURANCE", "SHOPPING", "WIRELESS", "E-MAIL CENTER", "BOARDS", "FREE HEADLINE FEED". Above this sidebar is a "SPONSORED BY: PROGRESSIVE AUTO INSURANCE" banner. The main content area has a white background. At the top, it says "WASHINGTON July 21, 2004" followed by a paragraph about surveillance video from Washington's Dulles Airport. Below this is another paragraph about the video showing an airport screener checking baggage. A yellow highlight is under "Nawaf al-Hazmi, for traces of explosives". There is an "ADVERTISEMENT" section with text about the disclosure of the video. Below that are several paragraphs of text detailing the hijacking, including names like Khalid al-Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, and Hani Hanjour. At the bottom of the main content area is a search bar with the text "Search the Web and ABCNEWS.com" and a "GO" button. A copyright notice is at the very bottom: "Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed."

*Fair Use: For more information see footnote. ¹⁷

¹⁷ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

We have two separate planes where two different alleged hijackers were screened for explosives; we have two different planes where two different reports are stating guns are on board. One aircraft belonged to American Airlines and another to United Airlines. Both airline company securities had the obligation to detain these passengers and/or alleged hijackers until the appropriate authority cleared them.

In the Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation for 2001 report, released by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), “one of the hijackers on board UAL flight 93 also claimed to have a bomb strapped to his body, but the passengers apparently did not believe him, and no evidence of a bomb explosion was found.” Assuming the report was referring to the crash site in Pennsylvania, no debris from Flight UA93 was found to have been credential enough for a National Transportation Security Board (NTSB) crash investigation to be conducted; therefore, the conclusions of the TSA report that “no evidence of a bomb explosion was found,” cannot be substantiated by evidence.


The FAA Staff Report also tells us that “On Flight 93, the cockpit key was kept in a storage compartment in the front of the airplane. It was United Air Lines’ policy at the time not to provide individual flight attendants with a key to the cockpit door.” As passengers aboard flights have no inside knowledge of these details, a question could be posed: How did the alleged hijackers know where the key was stored to open the cockpit door? Furthermore, according to a CBS article in February 2009, box-cutters were not even allowed to pass through airport security prior 9/11. This report follows in full.

CBS News

Box-cutters weren't allowed pre 9/11

February 11, 2009

CBS News.comCBS Evening NewsThe Early Show48 Hours Mystery60 MinutesSunday MorningFace the NationUp to the Minute



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February 11, 2009 8:56 PMPRINTTEXT

Boxcutters Weren't Allowed Pre-9/11

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(AP) A manual written by the airline industry years before the Sept. 11 attacks instructed airport screeners to confiscate from passengers boxcutters like those used by the hijackers, documents show.

Though the federal government did not specifically bar the objects before Sept. 11, the airlines were in charge of security and the manual they compiled was the guidebook for determining what items could be brought aboard flights.

The instructions were part of the Checkpoint Operations Guide, a manual issued by the Air Transport Association, which represents the major airlines, and the Regional Airline Association, the trade group for smaller carriers. The groups issued the guide to carry out Federal Aviation Administration regulations.

A copy of the 1994 manual was obtained by The Associated Press.

FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said keeping boxcutters off planes was an industry requirement, not a government order. She said the FAA allowed airline passengers to carry blades less than four inches long before Sept. 11. Government rules now prohibit such items.

Other items allowed into airplane cabins, according to the manual, included baseball bats, darts, knitting needles, pocket utility knives less than four inches long and scissors.

ATA spokesman Michael Wascom would say only: "Boxcutters were not prohibited by the FAA on 9-11-01." Officials of the regional airlines group declined comment.

Former FAA chief counsel Kenneth Quinn, now a lawyer representing several security companies, said the agency, not the industry, was responsible for keeping boxcutters off planes. "There's only one way to prohibit items from being carried on board airplanes, and that is through mandatory security directives from the FAA," Quinn said.

Before the terrorist attacks, the industry was responsible for security, under FAA oversight. The

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\$15 billion airline aid bill enacted shortly after Sept. 11 limited the airlines' liability to the amount of their insurance coverage. The House Republican version of legislation creating a Homeland Security Department would give the same liability limits to screening companies.

The fact that a boxcutter got aboard an airplane isn't going to guarantee victory in a lawsuit, said Dean Headley, associate professor of marketing at Wichita State University and co-author of an annual study on airline quality.

"I just don't think there is going to be a lot of lawsuits won or lost on that particular item," Headley said. "Other things that were equally or more potentially lethal were allowable and certainly not excluded."

The manual for security screeners was issued by the airlines' trade groups to comply with FAA regulations and was in effect at the time of the terror attacks. The document lists boxcutters and pepper spray as items not allowed past security checkpoints. Screeners were told to call supervisors if they found either item.

Attorney General John Ashcroft said some of the hijackers used boxcutters to take over the planes, and the indictment of alleged hijacking coconspirator Zacarias Moussaoui charged that Mohammed Atta, the leader of the hijackers, had pepper spray.

"We actually had rules and regulations to stop this," said former Transportation Department Inspector General Mary Schiavo, now a lawyer suing United Airlines and American Airlines on behalf of families of Sept. 11 victims.

Paul Hudson, head of the Aviation Consumer Action Project, an advocacy group, said this latest revelation is another reason for an independent commission to investigate Sept. 11.

"The congressional committees, while they did investigate intelligence and law enforcement, really haven't touched on airline security, as was operated by the airlines and regulated by the FAA," said Hudson, who lost his daughter in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.

By Jonathan D. Salant

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Security obligation	Airport	Flight	Comment
Globe Security Controlled checkpoints through which passengers gained access	Boston Logan International	Flight AA11	Contracted by AA ¹⁹
Huntleigh USA Controlled checkpoints through which passengers gained access	Boston Logan International	Flight UA175	Contracted by UA ²⁰ (ICTS parent company)
Argenbright Security, Inc. Controlled checkpoints through which passengers	Dulles International Airport	Flight AA77	Not contracted by UA Atlanta based subsidiary of Securicor. Maintained "a high number of the employees with

¹⁸ [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml]

¹⁹ 9/11 Commission Report (p.11).

²⁰ Ibid.

gained access			security responsibilities appeared to be of Middle Eastern decent.” (FBI)
Argenbright Security, Inc. Controlled checkpoints through which passengers gained access	Newark Liberty Airport	Flight UA93	Atlanta based subsidiary of Securicor. Maintained “a high number of the employees with security responsibilities appeared to be of Middle Eastern decent.” (FBI)

Argenbright Security, Inc

According to FBI interviews with Katherine Goudreau, a Director Project Manager with FMC Airport Systems, the security company Argenbright Security, Inc., maintained “a high number of the employees with security responsibilities appeared to be of Middle Eastern decent.” The company’s vice president was Larry G. Parrotte. *Atlanta Business Chronicle* on October 12, 2001, reported “The Company also provides services at Boston’s Logan Airport, but does not work for United or American, the airlines whose planes were hijacked there and crashed into the World Trade Centre.” ²¹

Argenbright’s subsidiary (Securicor) was one of the United Kingdom’s largest security businesses. It was once a constituent of the FTSE 100 Index but it merged with Group 4 Falck in 2004. ²² Securicor, along with co-founder British Telecom, was involved with the creation of mobile phone operator Cellnet in 1985. Securicor sold its share in the company to British Telecom in 1999, resulting in the formation of BT Cellnet, which was later spun off as O₂.

ICTS International

An Israeli firm based in the Netherlands that develops products and provides consulting and personnel services in the field of aviation and general security. It was established in 1982, by former members of the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, and El Al airline security agents. The company’s shares are traded on NASDAQ under the symbol ICTS. The firm and its subsidiaries specialize in aviation security services, operating airport checkpoints and electronic equipment, such as x-ray screening devices and manual devices, and verifying travel documents. Security services and consulting are also provided to other public and private transportation sectors. In 2008, the company employed 3,350 people with annual sales revenue of 98.8 million USD.

Huntleigh USA

ICTS is the Israeli parent company of Huntleigh USA, the passenger screening outfit that allegedly allowed armed terrorists to board the planes in Boston on September 11, according to the official version of events. On May 26, 2011, with the assent of attorneys for the plaintiffs, ICTS was dismissed from the 9/11 litigation. The following court

²¹ [<http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2001/10/08/daily55.html>]

²² Danish security and emergency services provider.

document of May 26, 2011, shows the Israeli company has been dismissed from any litigation, and accepted by Donald Migliori and Mary Schiavo, attorneys for the victim's family.

Case 1:02-cv-07154-AKH Document 144 Filed 05/26/11

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ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN
U.S.D.J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE SEPTEMBER 11 LITIGATION

21 MC 101 (AKH)
STIPULATION AND ORDER
This document relates solely to:
Bavis v. United Airlines Inc. et al.,
02 CV 7154

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED that this action be and hereby is discontinued with
prejudice and without costs, solely as to defendant ICTS International, N.V.

New York, New York
May 24, 2011

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
5/26/11

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SO ORDERED: *Alvin K. Hellerstein*
Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein, U.S.D.J.

Another interesting connection of airline security during the attacks was with Securacom (or Stratesec). Listed among its clients was Dulles International Airport, Hewlett-Packard, EDS, United Airlines, Gillette, MCI, the World Trade Centre, and other facilities including hospitals, prisons, corporations, utilities, universities. Securacom received a contract to provide electronic security services for the World Trade Centre in 1996. The contract ended on September 11, 2001, according to an article

published in *The Washington Spectator*, February 15, 2005.²³ What is more interesting in this article is that “One of Stratesec’s biggest security contracts was with the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority, to provide electronic security for Dulles and Reagan airports. The company got its first preventive-maintenance contract with Dulles airport in 1995 and received about \$6.3 million in revenue from the Dulles project between 1995 and 1998. Stratesec did not handle passenger screening at Dulles, where one of the 9/11 jets was hijacked. According to Dave Swennes, a contracting official for the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority, its three-year contract was for maintenance of security systems. The company maintained the airfield access system, the closed circuit television system and electronic badging. Given the security sensitivities of Dulles airport, there are ironies in having some of its electronic security handled by a company with Middle East ties. After completing its three-year contract with Dulles, the company bid on a new contract but lost out in spite of being the lowest bidder.”

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AIRPORT SECURITY

Feds: Airport security firm to admit violation

October 20, 2001

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Seventeen months after three managers pleaded guilty to breaking FAA rules by allowing untrained employees -- some with criminal backgrounds -- to operate airport checkpoints, an airport security firm is expected to admit it failed to complete court-ordered background checks on its employees, the U.S. Attorney said Saturday.

The admission will be made under the terms of a proposed settlement with the federal government. Representatives of Argenbright Security Inc. were not immediately available for comment.

The agreement, posted on the Department of Justice's Web site, calls for a series of corrective measures, including extending Argenbright's original three-year probation to five years, ending in October 2005.

Other terms would require "fingerprint based criminal background checks" on airport service employees, who would be barred from working in sensitive positions until results of the checks show they have not been convicted of a disqualifying crime.

Three Argenbright managers pleaded guilty in May 2000 to crimes involving Argenbright's employment practices at Philadelphia International Airport. The company was put on probation for three years, ordered to pay \$1.55 million in fines and restitution and put on "a mandatory and comprehensive compliance program."

Last week, the Department of Justice filed a motion against Argenbright charging violations of the probation.

A subsequent Department of Transportation audit of the company's operations at 14 airports found the company was still employing numerous airport screeners who had been convicted of crimes that should have disqualified them.

In the proposed settlement, Argenbright is expected to admit failing to complete required audits through April 2001. Limited audits that were performed uncovered regulatory violations.

In addition, the company failed to obtain third-party verifications of 22 of 34 operational audits conducted since August.

The Georgia-based firm provides security at Philadelphia International Airport and airports nationwide including Newark International Airport, Boston's Logan International Airport, Chicago's O'Hare International Airport and Washington Dulles International Airport.

Two of the four planes taken over by hijackers in the September 11 terrorist attacks took off from Logan and one plane each took off from Dulles and Newark.

*Fair Use: For more information see footnote.²⁴

²³ [http://www.washingtonspectator.org/articles/20050215bushes_1.cfm]

²⁴ [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml]

In order for a firearm to pass through airport security, there would have to be two situations which would allow for this. One, the firearm is carried on the aircraft by an official law enforcement body, such as an FBI Agent and/or Air Marshal; two, there would have to be a severe breach in airport security, and the weapon could have been planted on the aircraft by an employee who no longer works for some airline security company we investigated above during September 11, 2001. It would be very difficult at this point to investigate this matter, and should have been investigated with a fine toothcomb at the time.

END OF PART 2